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Abstract
This study explores a novel channel for monetary policy to impact growth and welfarea
cash-in-advance constraint on R&D combined with R&D subsidies by seigniorage tax. In a
scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model, growth is an inverted-U function of the ination
rate. Friedman rule is suboptimal (optimal) when the elasticity of labor supply is low (high).
By contrast, the inverted-U relation does not exist when R&D is subsidized by other taxes or
in an AK model. Calibration conrms our prediction and nds that the growth and welfare
e¤ects of ination are large. Using panel data for 154 countries during 19702014, both non-
parametric cubic spline and parametric regressions show that growth is an inverted-U function
of the ination rate in samples with an annual ination rate below 30%. The cuto¤ point
for ination to have a zero marginal e¤ect on growth is around 5% in ordinary least squares
estimation and 3% in instrumental variables (IV) estimation. We also nd that the share of
labor employed in R&Drather than the physical capital investment rateis an inverted-U
function of ination in IV estimation. Our empirical evidence provides support for our theory.
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1 Introduction
There is substantial long-standing debate over the e¤ect of ination on economic growthone funda-
mental issue in monetary economics (see, e.g., Tobin 1965; Sidrauski 1967; Stockman 1981; Gomme
1993; Jones and Manuelli 1995; Marquis and Re¤ett 1994; Dotsey and Sarte 2000; Funk and Kromen
2010; Chu and Lai 2013; Chu et al. 2015; He and Zou 2016; Chu, Ning and Zhu 2019; Chu et al. 2017;
Arawatari et al. 2018; Chu et al. 2019; He 2018a,b,c; Zheng et al. 2018). In this paper, we reveal a
novel channela cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on R&D investment combined with government
subsidies of R&D with the seigniorage revenuethrough which monetary policy may impact growth
and welfare. We nd that growth is an inverted-U function of the ination rate. Friedman rule is
suboptimal (optimal) when the elasticity of labor supply is low (high).
We calibrate the model to estimate the growth and welfare e¤ects of a change in the nominal
interest rate. Calibration shows the following. When 7.7% (15%) of the seigniorage revenue is used
in R&D subsidies, maximizing growth requires that the nominal interest rate increase from 9.6% to
11.9% (73%); the growth gain is 0.001% (0.66%), and the welfare gain is equivalent to a permanent
decrease in consumption of 0.35% (1.76%). To maximize welfare, the nominal interest rate must be
0% (33.6%), and the welfare gain is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 0.85%
(5.07%). The growth and welfare e¤ects are smaller when the elasticity of the labor supply is larger.
As an empirical test, we combine the most recent Penn World Table (PWT) 9.0 (explained by
Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer 2015) with the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World
Bank to build panel data for 154 countries during 19702014. We follow the common practice of
taking ve-year averages of data, which yields a balanced panel with 1,386 observations. We nd
the following. Both non-parametric cubic spline regression and parametric regressions indicate that
growth is an inverted-U function of the ination rate in samples with an annual ination rate below
30%. The cuto¤ point for ination to have a zero e¤ect on growth is around 5% in ordinary least
squares estimation and 3% in instrumental variables (IV) estimation.
To test the direct mechanism, we nd that the share of labor employed in R&D from the UNESCO
Institute for Statisticsrather than the physical capital investment rateis an inverted-U function
of the ination rate in IV estimation. Our empirical evidence provides support for our theory.
The contribution of our study is as follows. On the theoretical side, we propose a novel channel
for monetary policy to impact growth and welfare. There is a large body of literature studying
government subsidies of R&D (for Europe, see Almus and Czarnitzki 2002; Czarnitzki and Hussinger
2004; for China, see Boeing 2016; Wei, Xie and Zhang 2017). The United States is no exception.
We access the web page of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and nd that the amount of
Domestic R&D paid for and performed by the company is $282,570 million for all industries, while
Domestic R&D paid for by the U.S. federal government and performed by the company is $26,554
million for all industries in 2014. According to the H6 release of the Federal Reserve on Money Stock
and Debt Measures, the seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth for M1 and M2 during February
2017 to February 2018 are 6.7% and 4.0%, respectively, which would yield positive seigniorage. The
amount of remittances to the Treasury Required by the Federal Reserve Act, as amended by the
FAST Act totaled $91,467 million in 2016 (see Section 2.2 for details). Section 7(a) of the Federal
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Reserve Act states that the earnings transferred to the Treasury will be deposited into the general
fund of the Treasury. Therefore, the seigniorage of the Federal Reserve may be used in government
subsidies of R&D through many government agencies including the NSF.
Given the real-world relevance, it is important for us to investigate how this institutional feature
would a¤ect the impact of monetary policy on growth and welfare. We nd that government subsidies
of R&D with the seigniorage revenue would produce a positive seigniorage e¤ect of a higher nominal
interest rate on growth. When the CIA constraint is applied to R&D investment, a higher nominal
interest rate decreases R&D and thereby growth (a negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect). At low levels of
ination, the positive seigniorage e¤ect dominates, and ination promotes growth; however, beyond
a particular point, the negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect dominates, and ination retards growth. The
substantial growth and welfare e¤ects have been presented above.
By contrast, the inverted-U relationship does not exist when R&D is subsidized by other taxes.
The di¤erence in results can be explained as follows. When the R&D subsidy comes from seigniorage,
it naturally changes with the monetary policy/ination. When the R&D subsidy comes from con-
sumption tax, it will not change with the ination rate. Therefore, the other taxes cannot generate
the changing seigniorage e¤ect, ending up being unable to produce the inverted-U result. Growth
remains to be a decreasing function of ination when R&D is subsidized by other taxes.
Moreover, the same seigniorage approach can only predict a nonlinear but monotonenegative
or positivee¤ect of money growth on long-run growth in the AK model. In Schumpeterian growth
models, R&D activities and, therefore, the levels of productivity are endogenous. In contrast, the
level of technology is xed in the AK model, which does not respond to changes in the nominal
interest rate. Therefore, the growth dynamics in the AK model will be not as rich as those in
Schumpeterian growth models. Our approach to the non-monotone e¤ect of ination on growth
complements the heterogeneity approach of Chu et al. (2017), Arawatari et al. (2018) and Chu et al.
(2019), who focus on heterogeneous rms, entrepreneurial ability, rms and households, respectively,
and the approach of combining vertical and horizontal innovations in Zheng et al. (2018).
On the empirical side, our study contributes to our understanding of the empirical debate on
the e¤ect of ination on growth (Kormendi and Meguire 1985; Barro 1995; Bullard and Keating
1995; Bruno and Easterly 1996; Fischer 1993; Ahmed and Rogers 2000; Kremer et al. 2011). Al-
though many empirical studies since the 1980s have found a negative e¤ect of ination on growth
(e.g., Kormendi and Meguire 1985), there are also studies that nd a positive e¤ect of ination
on growth (e.g., Bullard and Keating 1995; Ahmed and Rogers 2000).1 Moreover, there are many
studies that have already found a non-linear e¤ect of ination on growth.2 Most studies have used a
transformed variable of ination and the transformation is also non-linear (e.g., Drukker et al., 2005;
Khan and Senhadji, 2001; Kremer, Bick and Nautz, 2013), which attests to the non-linear e¤ect of
1There are also critics of the ndings. For instance, Barro (1995) nds that there is no relationship between pooled
decade averages of growth and ination in economies with annual ination below 15%. Bruno and Easterly (1996)
nd that the results are sensitive and depend on outliers with episodes of high ination.
2For instance, Khan and Senhadji (2001) have identied a threshold e¤ect in the ination-growth nexus. Kremer,
Bick and Nautz (2013) have found the thresholdbeyond which ination would decrease growthto be around 2%
for advanced countries and 17% for developing countries. Bruno and Easterly (1999) found that 40% annual ination
seems to be the upper limit, beyond which ination may signicantly reduce growth.
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ination on growth. However, transformation makes interpretation more di¢cult. Although there
are empirical studies testing the inverted-U relationship between ination and growth (Bick 2010;
López-Villavicencio and Mignon 2011), our study shows that the inverted-U relationship holds at
low levels of ination and we establish a causal e¤ect.
Our study relates to the literature on the e¤ect of R&D subsidies on growth and welfare (see
Segerstrom, 1998, 2000, and references therein). According to Segerstrom (1998), R&D subsidies do
not have long-run growth e¤ects, but they have welfare e¤ects. Segerstrom (2000) considers both
horizontal and vertical R&D and nds that R&D subsidies decrease long-run growth. We model
R&D subsidies as an increase in income for entrepreneurs and they are nanced by seigniorage, while
Segerstrom (1998, 2000) assumes that R&D expenditures are subsidized by lump-sum government
taxation. However, the di¤erence in ndings is not due to how R&D is subsidized. Instead, it is
because a higher R&D subsidy does not impact the long-run innovation rate in any industry in
Segerstrom (1998), but it does in our model as in the seminal new growth models of Romer (1990)
and Aghion and Howitt (1992) (discussed in Segerstrom, 1998).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the motivating evidence. Section 3 presents
the model. Sections 4 and 5 provide the empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence
2.1 The Inverted-U Relationship between Growth and Ination
As discussed (see Section 4 for details), we combine the PWT 9.0 with the WDI of the World Bank
to build panel data for 154 countries during 19702014. Taking ve-year averages of data yields a
balanced panel with 1,386 observations.
The true data-generating process underlying the relationship between the outcome (growth) and
the predictor (ination) is unknown. The relationship is found to be monotonenegative or positive
(see references discussed above), non-monotone (Chu et al. 2017), or monotone but non-linear
(Arawatari et al. 2018). Therefore, it is useful for us to visualize the relationship between the
outcome (growth) and the predictor (ination).
Facing an unknown data-generating process, researchers have developed many exible smoothing
tools, aiming to represent the relationship between the outcome and the predictor as accurately and
unbiasedly as possible. These non-parametric smoothers include kernel-based scatterplot smoothers
and regression splines, among many others. We use cubic spline regression. With a small neighbor-
hood size, the tted function is more responsive to local disturbance and is thereby more smooth.
However, it is also more prone to bias. We focus on presenting the partial regression plot between
growth and ination. That is, we rst regress growth on all the other control variables (i.e., the initial
output per employment, the logarithms of human capital, physical capital investment, international
trade and government spending) and xed country and e¤ects and obtain the growth residuals. Then
we regress ination on the same set of variables to obtain the ination residuals. We then plot the
growth residuals against the ination residuals. The data is centered at medium levels of ination.
Therefore, we choose more knots around the medium levels of ination to ensure smoothness.
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As discussed later, when the ination rate is high enough, R&D labor will be zero. In other
words, the positive growth rates in these high ination countries may not be best explained by our
R&D-based Schumpeterian model. Therefore, we drop the observations with average annual ination
above 30% (which leaves 992 observations in our sample). Figure 1a illustrates the results of cubic
spline regression (with degrees of freedom being 3) for the new sample. The tted line clearly shows
an inverted-U relationship between growth and ination in the sample with average annual ination
below 30%. To avoid the inuence of the outlier, we drop the observations with average annual
ination below -5% (which drops two observations). Figure 1b illustrates the resultant cubic spline
regression results. The tted line still shows an inverted-U relationship between growth and ination.
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Figure 1. Partial Cubic Spline Regression (d.f.=3)
Therefore, using non-parametric regression splines, we nd the existence of an inverted-U rela-
tionship between growth and ination in our largest cross-country panel data (see also Bick 2010;
López-Villavicencio and Mignon 2011; Kremer et al., 2013). Our non-parametric regression is just a
correlation even if we use residuals from a growth regression against residuals from an ination re-
gression to avoid the potential bias from omitting the other important control variables listed above.
We leave the establishment of a causal relationship to Section 4. In the following, we rst propose a
monetary Schumpeterian model to explain the inverted-U relationship between growth and ination.
Our model features important real world facts, as elaborated on in the following section.
2.2 Government Subsidies of R&D and Seigniorage
2.2.1 Government Subsidies of R&D
It is now commonly held that R&D is the engine of sustained long-run growth. Therefore, it is not
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surprising that in almost all countries, the government provides R&D subsidies to rms, aiming to
promote business development. The provision of government subsidies to R&D has intensied in this
era of globalization as each country attempts to gain an advantage over others in technology and
thereby in terms of trade in exporting. Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) highlight:
In recent years a growing gap in the levels of research investment between Europe and the
U.S. or Japan has been observed. European governments fear the negative consequences
for the longrun technological performance, growth and employment potential. For this
reason, the 2002 EU member states agreed on the socalled Barcelona objectives. On this
basis, the Action Plan for Europe has been proposed: the European R&D expenditure
should be increased from currently 1.9% of GDP to 3.0% by 2010, where two thirds should
be nanced by the business sector, as its R&D spending is currently lagging behind the
U.S. and Japan. In order to achieve this goal, national governments are requested to
reinforce their national technology programs to support R&D in the business sector.
There is a large body of literature studying government subsidies of R&D (Almus and Czarnitzki
2002; Czarnitzki and Hussinger 2004; Boeing 2016; Wei, Xie and Zhang 2017). For instance, Almus
and Czarnitzki (2002) note, In 1998, the German federal government spent about 2.2 billion Euros
on promoting R&D activities in the business sector. With a one-party non-democratic government,
China is known for its heavy R&D subsidies to rms (reviewed by Boeing 2016), favoring large
state-owned rms over private and foreign ones (see Wei, Xie and Zhang 2017).
The United States is no exception. We access https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsf18302/ for
data from Business Research and Development and Innovation: 2014. The amount of Domestic
R&D paid for and performed by the company is $282,570 million for all industries, while Domestic
R&D paid for by the U.S. federal government and performed by the company is $26,554 million for
all industries in 2014. The United States has many forms of government R&D subsidies, including
tax credits and subsidies from local governments. For instance, we access the web page of the U.S.
Department of Treasury to obtain data on federal spending. In the rst quarter of 2018, the federal
spending to the NSF is $539.1 million. The NSF used the funds to subsidize R&D. One can see
that the amount of domestic R&D nanced by the federal government [$26,554 million in 2014] is
much larger than the budget of the NSF [$539.1 million in the rst quarter of 2018], which means
the federal government subsidies of R&D also come from other government agencies.
2.2.2 Government Subsidies of R&D by Seigniorage
In almost countries, government spending is funded by taxes, seigniorage or both. Seigniorage is im-
portant in developed countries and represents a much larger share of government spending in develop-
ing countries (see Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 1996, p. 527). Here we report some evidence of the importance
of seigniorage in the United States. We access the https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2016-
ar-federal-reserve-banks.htm#14894 to acquire the data on the amount of remittances to the Treasury
by the Federal Reserve. The amount of remittances to the Treasury Required by the Federal Reserve
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Act, as amended by the FAST Act totals $91,467 million in 2016.3
The large amount of remittances partly comes from seigniorage. As we will show later, if the
money growth rate is above zero, there will be positive seigniorage. According to the H6 release of the
Federal Reserve on Money Stock and Debt Measures, the seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth
for M1 and M2 during February 2017 to February 2018 are 6.7% and 4.0%, respectively. With
regard to the Use of Earnings Transferred To The Treasury, Section 7(b) Division of Earnings
of the Federal Reserve Act notes, The net earnings derived by the United States from Federal
Reserve banks shall, in the discretion of the Secretary, ..., or shall be applied to the reduction of
the outstanding bonded indebtedness of the United States under regulations to be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury.
Section 7(a) of the Federal Reserve Act states that the earnings transferred to the Treasury is
deposited into the general fund of the Treasury. The general fund is used to fund the spending by
all U.S. government agencies, including the NSF. Therefore, the seigniorage of the Federal Reserve
is used to fund the government subsidies of R&D.
3 Monetary Schumpeterian Model
In order to explain the inverted-U relationship between growth and ination, we introduce two pieces
into the seminal contribution of Aghion and Howitt (1992). The rst one is a CIA constraint on
R&D. The second one is the government subsidy of R&D with the seigniorage revenue (see the
stylized facts in Section 2.2). None of these two elements is new. But their combination creates a
novel view of the e¤ect of ination on growth and welfare. It is worth discussing the following issues.
First, it makes no di¤erence whether we use the monetary Schumpeterian quality-ladder model
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992) based on Chu and Cozzi (2014), or the monetary variety-expanding model
(i.e., Romer, 1990) based on He (2015). We follow the approach in Chu and Cozzi (2014) to compare
the growth and welfare e¤ects with existing monetary Schumpeterian quality-ladder models (see,
e.g., Chu, Ning and Zhu, 2019; Chu et al., 2017, 2019; He, 2018, a,c). In so doing, we can appreciate
further the magnitude/importance of our mechanism. Nevertheless, the results hold up if we follow
our own approach in He (2015). We will briey discuss this issue in Section 3.11.1.
Second, although government spending, including the government subsidies of R&D through the
NSF, may be funded by taxes, seigniorage or both, we show that the inverted-U relationship cannot
be generated when R&D subsidies are nanced by other taxes in Section 3.11.2.
3.1 Households
At time t, the population size of each household is xed at L. There is a unit continuum of identical
households, which have a lifetime utility function
U =
Z 1
0
e t [ln (ct) +  ln (1  lt)] dt, (1)
3The Federal Reserve states: The FAST Act, which amended section 7(a) of the Federal Reserve Act, requires
that any Reserve Bank capital surplus in excess of $10 billion be transferred to Treasury.
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where ct is per capita real consumption of nal goods and lt is per capita supply of labor at time t.
 2
 
0; 1
2

is the rate of time preference and  > 0 captures leisure preference. For instance, Chu,
Ning, and Zhu (2017) set the discount rate  to 0.04 (much smaller than 0.5). Each individual is
endowed with one unit of labor. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is no population
growth. Although we use elastic labor supply, our prediction on the hump-shaped response of growth
to ination does not depend on this (the magnitudes of growth and welfare e¤ects depend on the
elasticity of labor supply). In our quantitative analysis section, elastic labor supply gives a more
realistic measure of growth and welfare e¤ects.
Each household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation

at +

mt = rtat + wtlt   ct   tmt + itbt + (1  )  t, (2)
where at is the real value of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate-goods rms owned by each
member of the household; rt and wt are the rate of real interest and the wage, respectively; mt is
the real money balance held by each person, and t is the ination rate; and bt is the real money
balance borrowed by entrepreneurs to nance R&D, and its return is the nominal interest rate it.
The literature traditionally assumes that seigniorage revenue is rebated as a lump-sum transfer
to the household, with per capita transfer as  t. As discussed in Section 2.2, the seigniorage revenue
in the U.S. may be used to subsidize domestic R&D. Section 2.2 illustrates that the amount of
remittances of the Federal Reserve to the Treasury ($96,902 million in 2014) is much larger than that
of the domestic R&D paid for by the U.S. federal government. For this reason, we assume that part
of (i.e.,  2 [0; 1] share of) the seigniorage revenue is used to subsidize business-promoting activities
(i.e., (1  )  t is rebated to households). In so doing, we can get a positive seigniorage e¤ect from
a higher nominal interest rate that would promote growth (elaborated upon later).
As a side note, we will show in section 3.11.2 that using other taxes to subsidize R&D would
not yield an inverted-U e¤ect of ination on growth. In reality, government revenue also comes from
channels other than seigniorage. However, as long as seigniorage (even if part of seigniorage) is used
in subsidizing R&D, there will be a hump-shaped response of growth to ination. In other words,
considering other taxes would not change the main prediction of our model. On the ip side, if
we observe a hump-shaped response of growth to ination (see our empirical sections), our model
o¤ers an original mechanism to rationalize the empirics, which also has profound policy implications.
Therefore, for simplicity but without loss of generality, we abstract from considering other taxes.
The CIA constraint is given by ct + bt  mt. As in Chu and Cozzi (2014), when the CIA
constraint applies to R&D investment, a higher nominal interest rate will place an additional cost
on the borrowing of entrepreneurs, which will generate a negative e¤ect of an increasing nominal
interest rate on growth. We refer to this e¤ect as a negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect.
Using Hamiltonian (see the Appendix I for derivation), we can derive the no-arbitrage condition
it = t + rt (the Fisher equation) and the optimality condition for consumption
1
ct
= t (1 + it) , (3)
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where t the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2).
The optimal condition for labor supply is

1  lt
= wtt, (4)
where the left side of equation (4) is the marginal disutility of labor, and the right side of equation
(4) is the marginal benet of labor. Using (3), we rewrite the optimal condition for labor supply as
lt = 1 
ct (1 + it)
wt
. (5)
According to (5), a higher nominal interest rate hurts growth by decreasing labor supply (the
market size e¤ect in Aghion, Akcigit and Fernández-Villaverde 2013). The Euler equation is
 

t
t
= rt   . (6)
3.2 Labor Market
The xed aggregate labor supply L has two uses. First, some labor is used in producing intermediate
goods. Second, some labor is used as research input. The labor market clearing condition is
Lx;t + Lr;t = ltL, (7)
where Lx;t and Lr;t are the total employment in manufacturing and R&D, respectively. We dene
lr;t  Lr;t=L as the share of employment in the R&D sector. Similarly, the share of labor in production
is lx;t  Lx;t=L.
3.3 Final-Goods Sector
The nal-goods sector is competitive. The production function of the nal-goods rms is
yt = exp
Z 1
0
ln xt (j) dj

, (8)
where xt (j) denotes intermediate goods j 2 [0; 1]. The nal goods rms maximize their prot, taking
the price of each intermediate good j, denoted pt (j), as given. The demand function for xt (j) is
xt (j) = yt=pt (j) . (9)
3.4 Intermediate-Goods Sector
There is a unit continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods. Each industry is
temporarily dominated by an industry leader until the arrival of the next innovation, and the owner
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of the new innovation becomes the next industry leader. The leader in industry j has the following
production function:
xt(j) = 
qt(j)Lx;t(j). (10)
The parameter  > 1 is the step size of an improvement in productivity, and qt(j) is the number of
productivity improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t. Lx;t(j) is the production
labor in industry j. Equation (10) adopts a cost-reducing view of vertical innovation. Given qt(j),
the marginal cost of production for the industry leader in industry j is mct(j) = wt=
qt(j). Standard
Bertrand price competition leads to a prot-maximizing price pt (j) determined by a markup  (the
step size of innovation) over the marginal cost. The amount of monopolistic prot is
t (j) =

   1


pt (j) xt (j) =

   1


yt. (11)
The labor income from production is
wtLx;t(j) =

1


pt (j) xt (j) =

1


yt. (12)
3.5 Seigniorage Revenue from Ination
The government controls the nominal money supply, denoted Mt. It is equivalent to the case in
which the nominal interest rate is chosen as the policy instrument because it =

M t=Mt + . The
derivation is as follows. The per capita real money balance mt is mt = Mt= (PtL), where Pt is the
price level of the nal goods and

P t=Pt = t. Therefore,

mt=mt =


M t=Mt

  t. On the balanced
growth path, mt and ct grow at the same rate gt (the balanced growth rate). Using equations (3)
and (6), we have gt = rt   . Therefore,

mt=mt =


M t=Mt

  t = gt = rt   , which, combined
with the Fisher equation, delivers

M t=Mt = it   .
The total seigniorage revenue Rt =  tL is Rt =

M t=Pt =


M t=Mt

mtL. Therefore, if the growth
rate of the money supply is above zero (i.e.,

M t=Mt > 0, which is equivalent to (it ) > 0), there will
be positive seigniorage revenue; otherwise, the seigniorage revenue would be negative. Specically,
Rt =

M t
Pt
=


mt + tmt

L =
 

mt
mt
+ t
!
mtL
yt
yt = (it   )tyt, (13)
where we use the facts that on the balanced growth path mt, ct and yt all grow at the same rate gt
and gt + t = it   ; we dene t as the money-output ratio Lmt=yt, and t is endogenous.
3.6 Research Arbitrage
The sole input of R&D is labor. Entrepreneurs have to borrow money from households to pay the
wage bill of R&D workers (i.e., R&D is subject to the CIA constraint), raising the R&D cost by
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(1 + i). Therefore, the zero-expected-prot condition of R&D rm k 2 [0; 1] in each industry is
t (k) vt = (1 + i)wtLr;t(k), (14)
where Lr;t(k) is the amount of labor hired by R&D rm k, and t (k) (the rm-level innovation rate
per unit time) is t (k) =
'
L
Lr;t(k), where ' is a constant. This assumption eliminates the scale
e¤ects (see discussions of scale e¤ects in Laincz and Peretto, 2006; Segerstrom, 1998). The aggregate
arrival rate of innovation t is
t =
Z 1
0
t (k) dk =
'
L
Lr;t = 'lr;t, (15)
where lr;t = Lr;t=L is the share of employment in the R&D sector.
We denote by vt (j) the value of the monopolistic rm in industry j. In a symmetric equilibrium,
vt (j) = vt (Cozzi et al., 2007, provide a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to
be the unique rational-expectation equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models). The no-arbitrage
condition for vt is
rtvt = bt + vt   tvt. (16)
Equation (16) says that the return of holding an innovation rtvt equals the sum of the ow prot
of innovation bt and potential capital gain ( vt) less the expected capital loss tvt.
Because entrepreneurs get the seigniorage revenue, their prots will be the usual monopolistic
prot from innovations (the t in equation 11) plus the extra seigniorage revenue (the  share of the
seigniorage revenue Rt given in equation 13). Therefore, we have
bt = t (j) + Rt =    1


yt + (it   )tyt. (17)
The last term in (17) is the government subsidies of R&D with the seigniorage revenue, which will
yield the positive seigniorage e¤ect (i.e., a higher nominal interest rate tends to promote R&D and
thereby growth) discussed above. We model R&D subsidies as an increase in income for entrepreneurs
(please see Segerstrom, 2000, for R&D subsidies through subsidizing R&D expenditures).
3.7 General Equilibrium
The general equilibrium is a time path of prices fpt (j) , rt, wt, it, vtg and allocations {ct, lt, bt, mt,
yt, xt (j), Lx;t (j), Lr;t (k)}, which satisfy the following conditions at each instant of time:
 households maximize utility taking prices frt, wt, itg as given;
 competitive nal-goods rms maximize prot takingfpt (j)g as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-goods rms choose fLx;t (j) , pt (j)g to maximize prot taking fwtg
as given;
 R&D rms choose fLr;t (k)g to maximize expected prot taking fwt, it, vtg as given;
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 the labor market clears (that is, Lx;t + Lr;t = Llt);
 the nal goods market clears (that is, yt = ctL+ Rt);
 the CIA constraint binds: ct + bt = mt;
 the value of monopolistic rms adds up to the value of households assets (i.e., vt = atL);
 the amount of money borrowed by R&D is wtLr;t = btL.
3.8 Balanced Growth Path
Plugging equation (10) into (8), we have
yt = exp
Z 1
0
qt (j) dj ln 

Lx = exp
Z t
0
vdv ln 

Lx = ZtLx, (18)
where Zt  exp
R t
0
vdv ln 

is the level of aggregate technology. The growth rate of Zt is
gz = t ln  = 'lr;t ln . (19)
There is no transitional dynamics in our model, as proven in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Given a xed nominal interest rate i,  6 1
2  1

is su¢cient (but not necessary) to
ensure that the economy immediately jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path
on which each variable grows at a constant rate.
Proof. See the Appendix II.
According to the proof of Proposition 1, given a xed nominal interest rate it = i, the equi-
librium labor allocation is stationary on a balanced growth path. On the balanced growth path,
equation (18) shows that the growth rate of total output is gy = gz. Per capita consumption is
ct = [1  (it   )t] yt=L, implying that ct and Zt must grow at the same rate: gc = gz. According
to equation (19), the balanced growth rate is uniquely pinned down by the share of labor employed by
R&D rms lr;t, we solve for the equilibrium labor allocation. First, using the goods market clearing
condition and the binding CIA constraint, we can solve for the money-output ratio t as:
t =
Lmt
yt
=
L (ct + bt)
yt
= [1  (it   )t] +
lr
lx
)  =
1
1 + (i  )

1 +
lr
lx

. (20)
Using

vt=vt = g, bt = (+ ) (1 + i)wtLr;t, (12), (15), and (17), we have
(   1) lx + (i  )lx = (lr + =') (1 + i) . (21)
The labor market clearing condition is
lr + lx = 1  lx (1 + i) [1  (i  )] . (22)
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Equations (20)(22) solve for flr; lx; g as functions of the nominal interest rate i.
3.9 The Inverted-U Relationship between Growth and Ination
As discussed, our predictions do not depend on elastic labor supply (see the results under our
calibrated parameter values with elastic labor supply). Therefore, we illustrate our prediction with
inelastic labor supply  = 0. Using (20) to substitute for  in (21) and combining with a simplied
(22): lr + lx = 1, we solve for flr; lxg as functions of the nominal interest rate i:
lr =
(   1) [1 + 2 (i  )]  (1 + i) [1 +  (i  )] 
'
+  (i  )
(   1) [1 + 2 (i  )] + (1 + i) [1 +  (i  )]
, (23)
lx =
(1 + i) [1 +  (i  )]

1 + 
'

   (i  )
(   1) [1 + 2 (i  )] + (1 + i) [1 +  (i  )]
. (24)
Proposition 2 In the steady state, growth is an inverted-U function of the nominal interest rate
when  >
( 1)(1+ ')
1+ 
2
+( 1)

2+2+ +2
2
'
 .
Proof. See the Appendix III.
It is worth discussing the logical consistency between Propositions 1 and 2.  6 
2 1
and
 >
b(1+ ')
1+ 
2
+b2+2+ +22
'
  b (where b = (   1)) are su¢cient for Propositions 1 and 2, respectively,
to hold. b = (   1) is very small. For instance, according to Chu, Ning and Zhu (2019),  = 1:05,
which yields b < b = 0:05. Therefore, when b 6  6 1
2  1

, both Propositions 1 and 2 will hold.
That is, the economy always immediately jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth
path, on which the balanced growth rate is an inverted-U function of the nominal interest rate.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. First, the balanced growth rate given in equation
(19) is linear in the share of labor employed by R&D rms lr, as in standard Schumpeterian growth
models (see e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1998, ch. 2; Chu and Cozzi, 2014). Therefore, we only need to
discuss the intuition why the share of labor employed by R&D rms lr is an inverted-U function of
the nominal interest rate, as elaborated on below.
Similar to the benchmark Schumpeterian model in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 2), our model
features a unique equilibrium that is pinned down by two conditions: the arbitrage condition between
working in the manufacturing sector and working as a R&D researcher (i.e., the free labor mobility
condition that equates the wage rate between the two sectors of manufacturing and R&D) and the
labor market clearing condition. The labor market clearing condition under inelastic labor supply
is simply lr + lx = 1. Therefore, either one of manufacturing employment or R&D employment
increases, the other one must decrease. Therefore, how the share of labor employed by R&D rms lr
responds to the nominal interest rate is fully determined by the free labor mobility condition.
The free labor mobility condition is related to the return to and cost of R&D. The return to R&D
can bee seen from equations (14), (16) and (17). The last term in equation (17) indicates that the
government subsidies of R&D with the seigniorage revenue will yield a positive seigniorage e¤ect,
thereby drawing labor away from manufacturing into R&D. As a result, more R&D and thereby
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growth will be forthcoming. However, a higher nominal interest rate places an additional borrowing
cost for entrepreneurs, as indicated by the (1 + i) term in (14), ending up decreasing R&D (i.e., the
negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect).
Using the free labor mobility condition in equation (21), the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation
(21) is the benet of R&D, while the left-hand-side (LHS) of equation (21) is the cost of R&D. With
free labor mobility, the return to R&D equals its cost. When the nominal interest rate increases,
it increases the cost of R&D linearly, as indicated in the LHS of equation (21). By contrast, the
nominal interest rate a¤ects the benet of R&D non-linearly and through two terms: the linear (i )
term and the non-linear  (the money-output ratio) term. When the nominal interest rate increases
from  (when the seigniorage e¤ect is positive, which makes our explanation easier), the positive
seigniorage e¤ect is larger than the negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect when  >
( 1)(1+ ')
1+ 
2
+( 1)

2+2+ +2
2
'
 = b
(b < (   1)). Why? Using equation (13), the positive seigniorage e¤ect is proportional to the
output (for simplicity, thinking of the money-output ratio being around 1, when i =  in equation 20).
Therefore, a one-percentage-point increase in the nominal interest rate would generate the seigniorage
revenue of around 1% of output. The amount of the seigniorage revenue goes to entrepreneurs is
around 1%  of output. By contrast, a one-percentage-point increase in the nominal interest rate
would increase the R&D cost by only 1% of the wage payment to R&D workers, which is 1% of wtLr.
According to existing studies (e.g., Aghion, Akcigit and Fernández-Villaverde, 2013), the equilibrium
R&D share of GDP is around 3% for the U.S. economy. Therefore, the same one-percentage-point
increase in the nominal interest rate would increase the R&D cost by around 1%  3% of output.
Obviously, when the nominal interest rate increases from , the positive seigniorage e¤ect signicantly
dominates the negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect when  is larger than 3% (which is around b).
The nal free labor mobility condition in equation (21) equates the return to R&D with the cost
of R&D, instead of the marginal return to R&D with the marginal cost of R&D. Therefore, when the
nominal interest rate increases, the additional costdue to the CIA constraint on R&Don R&D
will be i  wtLr, not  i  wtLr. Therefore, as the nominal interest rate approaches innity, the
increase in R&D cost also approaches innity. By contrast, the seigniorage approaches 100% (that
is, the term (i   ) in equation 21 approaches 1) of output (the upper limit, which is nite) as
the nominal interest rate approaches innity. Obviously, the increase in R&D cost dominates that in
R&D subsidies with the seigniorage revenue. Therefore, the negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect dominates
the positive seigniorage e¤ect when the nominal interest rate is high enough.
Taken together, when  is above a threshold, when the nominal interest rate increases from zero,
initially, the positive seigniorage e¤ect dominates, thereby increasing R&D and growth; however,
when the nominal interest rate is beyond the threshold, the negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect dominates,
thereby lowering equilibrium R&D and growth. When  approaches zero, the positive seigniorage
e¤ect approaches zero and is always dominated by the negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect. In this case,
growth is a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate. Our mechanism di¤ers from and com-
plements the non-linear (Arawatari et al., 2018; Zheng et al., 2018) or inverted-U (Chu et al., 2017;
2019) e¤ect of ination on growth.
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3.9.1 Welfare and Ination
Our focus is on the relationship between ination and growth, but it is worth discussing optimal
monetary policy (i.e., the relationship between welfare and ination). In the following, we briey
discuss the results (we omit the proof to save space). Nevertheless, the predictions are conrmed by
our calibrations results presented in Section 3.10.
We nd that welfare is also an inverted-U function of ination when  is above a threshold (and
this threshold may be di¤erent from b) and the elasticity of labor supply is not too high. That is,
the Friedman rule (i.e., the optimal nominal interest rate should be zero, see Friedman, 1969) would
be suboptimal. Additionally, the nominal interest rate that maximizes growth is higher than that
maximizes welfare. The intuition is as follows. We use inelastic labor supply as an example. Welfare
consists of two parts: the initial level of per capita consumption that increases with manufacturing
labor; long-run growth that increases with R&D labor (see Section 3.10 for details). When R&D
labor increases, manufacturing labor decreases. Therefore, concerning welfare, when the nominal
interest rate increases, there is an additional decreasing current consumption e¤ect. As a result, the
nominal interest rate that maximizes welfare is lower than that maximizes growth. Nevertheless, the
positive seigniorage e¤ect on welfare dominates (is dominated by) the negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect
and the lower initial consumption e¤ect at low (high) levels of ination.
Under elastic labor supply, an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases labor supply through
the consumption-leisure choice. As a result, total labor supply decreases and leisure increases, thereby
increasing welfare. However, when the elasticity of labor supply is very high, the seigniorage e¤ect
decreases a lot. As a result, the gains in growth and leisure will be small when the nominal interest
rate increases. Actually, the gains in growth and leisure are dominated by the losses in current
consumption (see the welfare decomposition in Section 3.10). Therefore, Friedman rule is optimal.
It is worth mentioning the following. As discussed in Walsh (2010) and Chu et al. (2017),
the Fisher equation gives rise to a positive long-run relationship between the ination rate and the
nominal interest rate, which is supported by empirical studies (e.g., Mishkin, 1992; Booth and Ciner,
2001). In our model, as long as g0(i) < 1, we have 0(i) = (1  g0(i)) > 0. We nd that g0(i) < 1
under our calibrated parameter values. Therefore, economic growth would also be an inverted-U
function of ination, which is tested in Section 4. Before that, we calibrate the model and simulate
the quantitative e¤ects of ination on growth and social welfare to further increase the empirical
appeals of the paper (i.e., to appreciate the importance of our mechanism).
3.10 Quantitative Analysis
Our model has the following set of structural parameters f; ; ; '; g. We follow Chu, Ning, and
Zhu (2019) to set the discount rate  to a conventional value of 0.04 and the step size of innovation
 to 1.05. We need three conditions to pin down the values of f; '; g. The rst condition is the
long-run GDP per capita growth of 2% in advanced countries (see Chu et al., 2017; Chu and Cozzi,
2014). The second condition is the standard moment of l = 0:3, following Chu and Cozzi (2014).
The third condition is the share of the seigniorage revenue allocated to entrepreneurs, for which we
use the numbers for the United States in Section 2: The amount of Domestic R&D paid for and
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performed by the company is $282,570 million for all industries, while Domestic R&D paid for by the
U.S. federal government and performed by the company is $26,554 million for all industries in 2014.
Therefore, using (17), we have  1

yt= [(it   )tyt] =$282,570/$26,554. Here we have assumed that
the cost of R&D is shared according to the prot of R&D. Please note that these numbers may give
the lower bound (a conservative estimation) of  (around 8% in our calibration). For instance, the
amount of remittances to the Treasury totaled $96,902 million in 2014. If the domestic R&D paid
for by the U.S. federal government comes in its entirety from these remittances, then we should have
the upper bound of  as  = $26; 554=$96; 902  0:27.
The upper bound of  is lower than 1
2
. Therefore, according to Proposition 1, the condition  < 1
2
is su¢cient for the economy to immediately jump to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth
path. Because our model does not feature transitional dynamics, our following quantitative welfare
analysis is accurate.
We have i = 9:6%, the calculated sample value for advanced countries including the United States,
following He (2018a): i =  + r =  + + g + n (where the sample mean of ination rate is 2.71%,
population growth rate is 0.89%). We rst use the conservative estimate of , and then we discuss
how the change in  will a¤ect our results. Now we pin down the values of f; '; g by solving the
following equations:
g = (' ln ) lr = 0:02, (25)
l = 0:3, (26)
   1

= [(it   )t] = $282; 570=$26; 554. (27)
Solving equations (25)-(27) yields the values of f; '; g to be f0:0769; 31:42; 2:13g. To summa-
rize, we pin down the parameter values f; ; ; '; g as f0:04; 1:05; 0:0769; 31:42; 2:13g.
Figure 2 simulates the relationship between the nominal interest rate and economic growth, which
shows an inverted-U relation between the nominal interest rate and economic growth as long as 
is not too low. The case of  = 0 corresponds to that in Chu and Cozzi (2014), which shows that
growth is a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate. This is expected because both the
CIA-on-R&D and market-size e¤ects are negative, while the positive seigniorage e¤ect is absent.
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Figure 2. Growth and the Nominal Interest Rate
To calculate welfare, we impose balanced growth on (1) to have
U =
1


ln (c0) +
g

+  ln (1  l)

, (28)
where c0 = [1  (i  )]Z0lx =
h
1  (i )
1+(i )

1 + lr
lx
i
lx, where we follow Chu and Cozzi (2014)
to normalize Z0 to unity; g = 'lr ln .
The welfare gain can be decomposed into three parts. First, an increase in the nominal interest
rate would decrease labor supply through the consumption-leisure choice (the market-size e¤ect).
The decrease in labor supply means an increase in leisure, which increases welfare. The rst e¤ect
is captured by the third term  ln (1  l) in (28). Second, an increase in the nominal interest rate
changes the labor allocation between R&D and manufacturing. In our model with the positive
seigniorage e¤ect, R&D labor will increase and manufacturing labor will decrease. When R&D labor
increases, more innovation will be forthcoming, thereby increasing the balanced growth rate. As a
result, the welfare tends to increase. This second growth e¤ect is captured by the middle term g

in
(28). The rst two e¤ects are positive (negative) when the nominal interest rate increases (decreases).
The third e¤ect is reected by the rst term ln (c0) in (28). According to the output market clearing
condition, per capita consumption is a linear function of manufacturing labor. An increase in the
nominal interest rate decreases total labor supply and increases R&D labor, thereby signicantly
decreasing manufacturing labor. Additionally, when  increases, more seigniorage and thereby more
output will be used to nance entrepreneurs, which further decreases consumption. The welfare
e¤ects depend on the relative size of the three e¤ects.
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Columns 1.1 to 1.3 of Table 1 present the calibration results for our benchmark calibrated  =
0:0769. According to columns l.1 and 1.2, to maximize growth, i must increase from the benchmark
value of 9.6% to 11.9%, the equilibrium rate of economic growth increases from the benchmark value
of 2.000% to a maximum value of approximately 2.001% (the increase is negligible), and the welfare
gain U is equivalent to a permanent decrease in consumption of 0.35%. We have decomposed the
welfare gain into three parts. One can see that c0 decreases from 0.2857 to 0.2813. This negative
e¤ect on welfare dominates the two positive e¤ects on welfare due to the increases in growth (0.001%)
and leisure (from 0:7 to 0:7038). As a result, total welfare decreases.
As discussed, the nominal interest rate that maximizes growth does not necessarily maximize
welfare. According to columns l.1 and 1.3, to maximize welfare, i must decrease from the benchmark
value 9.6% to 0 (respecting the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate), which means  =
0:0769 is low enough that the Friedman rule is optimal. When i decreases from 9.6% to 0, the growth
rate decreases from 2.0% to 1.98%, and the welfare gain U is equivalent to a permanent increase in
consumption of 0.85%. Welfare decomposition shows that c0 increases from 0.2857 to 0.3054. This
positive e¤ect on welfare dominates the two negative e¤ects on welfare due to the decreases in growth
( 0.02%) and leisure (from 0:7 to 0:6817). As a result, total welfare increases.
As discussed, our calibrated  may under-estimate the true value of . If we assume the federal
government subsidies of R&D are fully nanced by the remittances to the Treasury from the Fed,
then we have the upper bound of  as  = $26; 554=$96; 902  0:27. Therefore, we also report the
calibration results for larger values of . The results are presented in columns 1.4 to 1.9 of Table 1.
Columns 1.4 to 1.6 of Table 1 present the calibration results for  = 0:15. According to columns
1.4 and 1.5, to maximize growth, imust increase from the benchmark value 9.6% to 73.1%, the growth
rate increases from 2.18% to a maximum value of 2.84%, and the welfare gain U is equivalent to
a permanent decrease in consumption of 1.76%. Similar welfare decomposition shows the e¤ect of
lower consumption on welfare dominates the two positive e¤ects on welfare due to the increases in
growth (0.66%) and leisure (from 0:6983 to 0:7622). Therefore, total welfare decreases.
According to columns l.4 and 1.6, to maximize welfare, i must increase from 9.6% to 33.6%, which
means the Friedman rule is suboptimal and the benchmark value of 9.6% for the nominal interest rate
is less than optimal. When i increase from 9.6% to 33.6%, the equilibrium rate of economic growth
increases from 2.18% to 2.66%, and the welfare gain U is equivalent to a permanent increase in
consumption of 5.07%. Similar welfare decomposition shows that c0 decreases from 0.2850 to 0.2436.
This negative e¤ect on welfare is dominated by the two positive e¤ects on welfare due to the increases
in growth (0.48%) and leisure (from 0:6983 to 0:7376). As a result, total welfare increases.
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Table 1: Calibration Results for di¤erent values of 
Column number
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
f; ; '; g = f0:04; 1:05; 31:42; 2:13g
 = 0:0769  = 0:15  = 0:2
max g max U max g max U max g max U
i 9.6% 11.9% 0 9.6% 73.1% 33.6% 9.6% 90.5% 46.6%
c0 0.2857 0.2813 0.3054 0.2850 0.1969 0.2436 0.2845 0.1790 0.2238
lr 0.0130 0.0131 0.0129 0.0142 0.0186 0.0173 0.0151 0.0236 0.0220
lx 0.2870 0.2831 0.3044 0.2875 0.2192 0.2551 0.2878 0.2139 0.2446
l 0.3 0.2962 0.3173 0.3017 0.2378 0.2724 0.3029 0.2375 0.2666
1  l 0.7 0.7038 0.6817 0.6983 0.7622 0.7376 0.6971 0.7625 0.7334
g 2.000% 2.001% 1.98% 2.18% 2.84% 2.66% 2.31% 3.61% 3.37%
U n/a  0.35% 0.85% n/a  1.76% 5.07% n/a 5.46% 14.32%
Note: i is the nominal interest rate; c0 is initial per capita consumption; lr and lx are the R&D
labor and manufacturing labor, respectively. l is total labor supply, and (1  l) is leisure. g is the
per capita growth rate. U is the welfare gain (equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption).
max g and maxU refer to nominal interest rates that maximize growth and welfare, respectively.
Columns 1.7 to 1.9 of Table 1 present the calibration results for  = 0:2. According to columns 1.7
and 1.8, to maximize growth, i must increase from the benchmark value 9.6% to 90.5%, the growth
rate increases from 2.31% to a maximum value of 3.61%, and the welfare gain U is equivalent to
a permanent increase in consumption of 5.46%. Similar welfare decomposition shows the e¤ect of
lower consumption on welfare is dominated by the two positive e¤ects on welfare due to the increases
in growth (1.30%) and leisure (from 0:6971 to 0:7625). As a result, total welfare increases.
According to columns l.7 and 1.9, to maximize welfare, i must increase from 9.6% to 46.6%
(i.e., both the Friedman rule and the benchmark value of 9.6% are suboptimal). When i increase
from 9.6% to 46.6%, the growth rate increases from 2.31% to 3.37%, and the welfare gain U is
equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 14.32%. Similar welfare decomposition shows
that c0 decreases from 0.2845 to 0.2238. This negative e¤ect on welfare is dominated by the two
positive e¤ects on welfare due to the increases in growth (1.06%) and leisure (from 0:6971 to 0:7334).
The substantial growth and welfare e¤ects when  is higher can be explained as follows. According
to our explanation on the mechanism of the inverted-U result following Proposition 2, when the
nominal interest rate increases from , the positive seigniorage e¤ect signicantly dominates the
negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect when  is higher. Therefore, the R&D labor and thereby the balanced
growth rate increases signicantly when the nominal interest rate increases. This explains the large
growth and welfare gains when  is higher.
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Figure 3. The e¤ect of elastic labor supply.
Figure 3 and Table 2 illustrate that the growth and welfare e¤ects also signicantly depend on the
value of . We use  = 0:08 as an example. The case of  = 0 corresponds to inelastic labor supply,
where the above-mentioned rst e¤ect is not present. In this case, the growth and welfare e¤ects are
much larger. According to columns 2.1 and 2.2 of Table 2, to maximize growth, i must increase from
9.6% to 196%, the equilibrium rate of economic growth increases from 7.13% to a maximum value
of 9.45%, and the welfare gain U is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 51.87%.
According to columns 2.1 and 2.3, to maximize welfare, i must increase from 9.6% to 144.8%, the
equilibrium rate of economic growth increases from 7.13% to a maximum value of 9.38%, and the
welfare gain U is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 55.12%. The results when
 = 1 (see columns 2.4 to 2.6) are similar to those in columns 1.1 to 1.3 of Table 1.
Columns 2.7 to 2.9 of Table 2 present the calibration results for  = 4. According to columns 2.7
and 2.8, to maximize growth, i must decrease from the benchmark value of 9.6% to 8.7%, the increase
in the growth rate is negligible, and the welfare gain U is equivalent to a permanent increase in
consumption of 0.15%. According to columns l.7 and 1.9, to maximize welfare, i must decrease from
9.6% to 0, which means the Friedman rule is optimal. When i decreases from 9.6% to 0, the decrease
in the growth rate is around 0.004%, and the welfare gainU is equivalent to a permanent increase in
consumption of 1.25%. Similar welfare decomposition shows that c0 increases from 0.1770 to 0.1910.
This positive e¤ect on welfare dominates the two negative e¤ects on welfare due to the decreases in
growth ( 0.004%) and leisure (from 0:8146 to 0:8021). As a result, total welfare increases.
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Table 2: Calibration Results for di¤erent values of 
Column number
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9
f; ; '; g = f0:04; 1:05; 31:42; 0:08g
 = 0  = 1  = 4
max g max U max g max U max g max U
i 9.6% 196% 144.8% 9.6% 31.8% 13.0% 9.6% 8.7% 0
c0 0.9491 0.8056 0.8379 0.4539 0.4063 0.4459 0.1770 0.1782 0.1910
lr 0.0465 0.0617 0.0612 0.0216 0.0221 0.0217 0.0076 0.0076 0.0076
lx 0.9535 0.9383 0.9388 0.4561 0.4158 0.4492 0.1778 0.1789 0.1903
l 1 1 1 0.4776 0.4379 0.4709 0.1854 0.1865 0.1979
1  l 0 0 0 0.5224 0.5621 0.5391 0.8146 0.8135 0.8021
g 7.13% 9.45% 9.38% 3.31% 3.38% 3.33% 1.16926% 1.16933% 1.1651%
U n/a 51.87% 55.12% n/a  1.82% 0.08% n/a 0.15% 1.25%
Note: i is the nominal interest rate; c0 is initial per capita consumption; lr and lx are the R&D
labor and manufacturing labor, respectively. l is total labor supply, and (1  l) is leisure. g is the
per capita growth rate. U is the welfare gain (equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption).
max g and maxU refer to nominal interest rates that maximize growth and welfare, respectively.
3.11 Robustness Checks
3.11.1 Monetary Variety-Expanding Model
As discussed, it is intriguing to investigate whether such an inverted-U relation between ination
and growth exists in the monetary variety-expanding model based on He (2015). To save space,
we omit the detailed steps. Our di¤erence from He (2015) is that the CIA constraint now applies
to R&D instead of manufacturing. Therefore, the negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect still exists. When
entrepreneurs are subsidized with the seigniorage revenue, the positive seigniorage e¤ect still exists.
Following He (2015), the households problem is the same as in Section 3.1. We consider inelastic
labor supply. As in He (2015), the nal-goods sector is competitive. The production function of a
nal-good rm i is
yi =
NX
j=1
XijL
1 
i , (29)
where N is the number of innovations, Xij is the amount of intermediate-good j used by a nal-good
rm i, and Li is the labor input of a nal-good rm i.  2 (0; 1). The total labor supply is xed at
L. Working through the model, the balanced growth rate is
g =
bt
 (1 + i)
   =
 
1 



2
1 L+  (i  )t
yt
Nt
 (1 + i)
  , (30)
where bt is the prot of entrepreneurs, which consists of the prot from production  1   21 L and
the subsidies from the government  (i  )t
yt
Nt
;  is the xed cost of each innovation (variety), and
 captures the strength of the CIA constraint on R&D investment.
According to (30), the negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect tends to decrease growth, while the positive
seigniorage e¤ect,  (i  )t
yt
Nt
, tends to increase growth. The mechanism is the same as that for
Proposition 2. At low levels of interest rate, the positive seigniorage e¤ect is larger than the negative
CIA-on-R&D e¤ect when  is large. The positive seigniorage e¤ect is proportional to the output.
Therefore, a one-percentage-point increase in the nominal interest rate would generate the seigniorage
revenue of around 1% of output. The amount of the seigniorage revenue goes to entrepreneurs is
around 1%   of output. By contrast, a one-percentage-point increase in the nominal interest
rate would increase the R&D cost by only 1% of  (the xed cost of each innovation, variety).
Obviously, if  is lower enough (it is only a su¢cient condition for us to illustrate the mechanism
clearly), the positive seigniorage e¤ect dominates the negative CIA-on-R&D e¤ect. Similarly, as the
nominal interest rate approaches innity, the increase in R&D cost also approaches innity. By
contrast, the seigniorage approaches 100% (that is, the term (i   ) in equation 30 approaches
1) of output as the nominal interest rate approaches innity. Therefore, the negative CIA-on-R&D
e¤ect dominates the positive seigniorage e¤ect when the nominal interest rate is high enough.
In summary, our inverted-U results hold up in monetary variety-expanding models.
3.11.2 Considering Other Taxes
It is useful to show whether our inverted-U result will hold if other tax revenues instead of the
seigniorage revenue are used as R&D subsidies. Answering this question would make our explanation
for the hump-shaped growth-ination relationship more compelling.
To accept our results, one needs to buy into our logic that seigniorage revenue (or ination tax)
subsidizes R&D. Our chain of reasoning is: (a) the Federal Reserve remits most of its net income
to the Treasury where it goes into general funds; (b) General funds are, then, used to fund the
NSF among other government agencies; and (c) the NSF then subsidizes R&D. We claim that on
average 8% of seigniorage revenue goes to subsidizing R&D (see Section 3.10). For 2016, the Federal
Reserve provided 2.8% of Federal Government tax revenue (the $91.47 billion reported above divided
by $3,270 billion in total tax revenue). In other words, our 8% gure appears to be roughly three
times too large. Further, just because x% of government tax revenue comes from seigniorage does
not necessarily mean that x% of an increase in seigniorage revenue will go to increasing subsidies
to R&D (through the NSF)marginal e¤ects need not correspond to average e¤ects. Finally, is
seigniorage revenue the best way to raise revenue for R&D subsidies?
Our reply to this concern is as follows. First, although the seigniorage goes to the government tax
revenue pool, we cannot say all tax revenues will nance the R&D subsidies equally. The government
subsidies of R&D with the seigniorage revenue can also be rationalized as follows. Considering the
central bank independence (CBI) literature (e.g., Bade and Parkin 1988; Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini 1991; Alesina and Summers 1993), one can deem the seigniorage revenue as required by
the central bank laws to subsidize growth-enhancing private activity. O¢cial policy in most OECD
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countries holds that channeling credit supply to those activities generating growth is best done by
a private banking system (aiming for the high return generated by growth), not by central banks.
Nevertheless, it may be the case empirically that the fraction of total credit supply (including credit
supply generated by money growth) used to nance growth-enhancing private activity is larger in
countries with a relatively independent central bank, and that correspondingly the fraction used to
nance non-productive government consumption is smaller in these countries.
Second, we can subsidize entrepreneurs with other taxes instead of seigniorage, but we will not
get any inverted-U relation between ination and growth. It is more interesting to consider other
distortionary taxes (the at-rate distortionary taxes in Aghion, Akcigit and Fernández-Villaverde
2013), but the results hold up for non-distortionary lump-sum taxes. We use the consumption tax
as an example. Unless consumption tax is endogenous and responds to ination in a similar way as
seigniorage (which we think is impossible or not relevant), there is no changing positive e¤ect and
growth is always a decreasing function of ination. We use the model with inelastic labor supply
(i.e.,  = 0 as in Section 3.9) for a simple illustration. The budget constraint becomes

at +

mt = rtat + wtlt   (1  tc) ct   tmt + itbt +  t, (31)
where tc is the distortionary consumption tax rate.
Now, we have the new nal goods market clearing condition: yt = ctL + Gt, where Gt = tcctL
is the tax revenue collected from consumption tax. We have Gt =
tc
1+tc
yt. The government uses the
consumption tax revenue to subsidize entrepreneurs. The prot of entrepreneurship bt becomes
bt = t (j) +Gt =    1


yt +
tc
1 + tc
yt. (32)
Working through the same steps, we have
(   1) lx +
tc
1 + tc
lx = (lr + =') (1 + i) . (33)
Equation (33) together with inelastic labor supply lr + lx = 1 would solve for flr; lxg as
lr =
h
(   1) + tc
1+tc
i 
1 + 
'

(   1) + tc
1+tc
+ 1 + i
 

'
, (34)
lx =
(1 + i)

1 + 
'

(   1) + tc
1+tc
+ 1 + i
. (35)
Comparing the R&D labor lr in (34) to that in (23), it is obvious that here the R&D labor lr and
thereby the balanced growth rate is a monotonically decreasing function of the ination rate.
The di¤erence in results can be seen clearly by comparing the R&D subsidies in (32) and (17).
When the R&D subsides come from seigniorage, it is (it  )tyt, which naturally changes with the
monetary policy (i.e., it). By contrast, when the R&D subsides come from consumption tax, it is
tc
1+tc
yt, which will not change with the monetary policy (i.e., it) or the ination rate (it is clearer in
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equation (33)). Therefore, the other taxes cannot generate the changing seigniorage e¤ect, ending
up being unable to produce the inverted-U result. The R&D subsides with other tax revenues can
increase R&D, but it is just a one-time change. Additionally, we have @lr=@tc > 0, which means
long-run growth is a monotonically increasing function of the consumption tax rate (but welfare is
not). Finally, whether seigniorage revenue is the best way to raise revenue for R&D subsidies is
beyond the scope of this paper, we leave this issue to future studies.
3.11.3 An AK Model
Here we investigate whether such an inverted-U relation between ination and growth exists in an
AK model (we cannot exhaust all the other endogenous growth models). Doing so helps us to further
understand the mechanism underlying our model. We show the details of the following case: the
government uses seigniorage to subsidize household accumulation of physical capital.4
There is a unit continuum of identical households, which have a lifetime utility function
U =
Z 1
0
e t ln (ct) dt, (36)
where the variables and parameters are dened as before. Each individual is endowed with one unit
of labor. Because it is an AK model, the wage rate is zero. Each household maximizes its lifetime
utility given in equation (36) subject to
(1  st)

kt +

mt = Akt   ct   tmt, (37)
where st is the rate of subsidies of capital investment. The CIA constraint is ct +

kt  mt. The
per capita seigniorage revenue  t is not lump-sum transferred to households, but used to subsidize
household accumulation of physical capital. That is, we have st

kt =  t.
The goods market clearing condition is ct +

kt = Akt. The binding CIA constraint means
ct+

kt = mt. We dene

M t=Mt =  . Therefore,  t =  mt =  Akt. As a result, we have st

kt =  Akt,
which gives st =  A=


kt=kt

. Therefore, st is a constant on the balanced growth path.
Using Hamiltonian [see the Appendix IV for derivation], the new balanced growth rate g2 is
g2 =
A
1 + +    s
  . (38)
4Additionally, we also studied two cases. The rst assumes that the seigniorage revenue is transferred back to
households. In this case, the growth rate is a decreasing function of the monetary growth rate (see Dotsey and Sarte,
2000, for similar results in discrete time). The result is driven by the negative CIA-on-investment e¤ect (see Stockman,
1981, for similar results in capital accumulation models). The second case introduces the assumption of government
subsidies of production with the seigniorage revenue. In this case, the balanced growth rate is a decreasing (non-linear
but monotone) function of the monetary growth rate, which is because the positive seigniorage e¤ect is dominated by
the negative CIA-on-investment e¤ect. The proofs of the rst two cases are available upon request.
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Now plugging s =  A=


kt=kt

=  A=g2 into the above equation solves g2:
g2 =
A
(1 + +  )   A
g2
  . (39)
There are two solutions to the quadratic function of (39): one is positive and the other is negative.
Now the balanced growth rate becomes a monotoneeither positive or negativefunction of the
monetary growth rate [see the Appendix IV for proof], which is because the positive seigniorage
e¤ect either dominates or is dominated by the negative CIA-on-investment e¤ect.
In summary, the same approach can only predicts a nonlinear but monotonenegative or positive
e¤ect of money growth on long-run growth in the AK model. In Schumpeterian growth models, R&D
activities and, therefore, the levels of productivity are endogenous. In contrast, the level of tech-
nology is xed in the AK model, which does not respond to changes in the nominal interest rate.
Therefore, the growth dynamics in the AK model will be not as rich.
4 Empirical Evidence
Although our non-parametric regression shows an inverted-U relationship, it is just a correlation. In
other words, the e¤ect of ination on growth may not be causal. When the e¤ect is not causal, the
inverted-U e¤ect of ination on growth may be spurious. Therefore, we have to establish a causal
relationship between ination and growth, which is the motivation of this section.
4.1 Empirical Specication
The vast body of empirical literature on growth regressions has established a more or less standard
empirical formulation (e.g., Barro 1991; Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). Essentially, the rate of
economic growth depends on the initial level of income per capita/worker, which captures the condi-
tional convergence e¤ect and the variable(s) of interest of the specic question that researchers would
like to investigate. Such variables (sometimes the interaction among the variables) include physical
and human capital investments and the growth rate of the labor force or population (Barro 1991;
Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992), democracy (e.g., Persson and Tabinilli 2009; Acemoglu et al. 2019
and references therein), exchange rate exibility (e.g., Aghion et al. 2009), and debt-to-GDP ratio
(e.g., Checherita-Westphal and Rother 2012), among many others. Considering the literature, our
empirical specication is as follows:
growthit = 0 + 1i;t + 2
2
i;t + 3 ln

RGDP
emp

i;t 1
+ 4 ln(csh_i)it + 5 ln(hc)it
+6 ln(Labor)it + 7 ln(csh_g)it + 8 ln(Trade)it + i + Tt + "it, (40)
where growthit is the average annual growth of real GDP per employment for country i during period
t;  is the average annual rate of ination during the same period. Our construction of the variables
mainly follows Mankiw et al. (1992). The control variables include the following. The variable
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ln

RGDP
emp

t 1
is the logarithm of real GDP per employment at the beginning of each period, which
is to control for conditional convergence. The variables csh_i, hc and csh_g are the physical capital
investment rate, human capital indicator and the share of government spending in GDP, respectively
(we use the same notation as in Feenstra et al., 2015, for easier reference by the readers). The variable
Labor measures labor force growth. The variable Trade measures the ratio of international trade to
GDP. i and Tt stand for the country xed e¤ects and time/period xed e¤ects, respectively.
There are several issues worth discussing. First, since this paper uses a model of endogenous
growth, it would be useful to think of the results working their way via R&D expenditure shares (or
labor force shares in R&D) rather than directly by output. We test this in Section 5. Additionally, it
does not make sense to control for investment rates if one of the papers arguments is that it a¤ects
output via investment rates. The Solow model assumes that investment rates are exogenous, but in
this model they are endogenous. Second, the paper controls for Solow Model variables and ends up
showing conditional convergence. Clearly, the theory itself lies squarely in the Schumpeterian quality
ladder framework. It seems that the empirics may not support conditional convergence. However, the
real world data would involve both conditional convergence and endogenous growth (see discussions
in Aghion and Howitt, 1998, ch. 12). Therefore, the investment rate is driven by both the Solow
model of capital accumulation and the endogenous model of R&D innovation. Therefore, many
endogenous models still use the augmented Solow model (e.g., Aghion et al., 2009).
According to equation (40), the ination variable enters the regression in a quadratic form. The
marginal e¤ect of ination on growth would be 1 + 22  i;t. Therefore, the e¤ect of ination
on growth would depend on the level of the ination rate if 2 6= 0. We are interested in testing
whether 2 < 0. However, a quadratic form with 2 < 0 could be either a concave or an inverted-U
function. The cuto¤ point of the ination rate with the marginal e¤ect of ination on growth being
zero is bi;t =   122 . If the threshold of ination is larger than the minimum level of ination and
smaller than the maximum level of ination in our sample, then growth is an inverted-U function of
ination. Otherwise, growth is a concave but monotone function of ination.
4.2 Data Sample
The recent PWT 9.0 (explained by Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer 2015) provides the most complete
and recent data for all the countries during 19502014. One reason for the time sample 19502014
may be due to the common practice in empirical growth literature of using ve-year averages of the
data to smooth out business cycle uctuations. We follow the common practice by taking ve-year
averages of the data as well. Therefore, the time sample of 19502014 naturally delivers 13 non-
overlapping ve-year average subperiods, the rst being 19501954 and the last being 20102014.
There are of course many missing data, especially during the early years and for developing
countries. Moreover, we acquire the ination data from the WDI of the World Bank, and most of
this data starts from year 1960 and some even starts from the late 1990s (e.g., the share of health
expenditures in GDP). Therefore, we drop the observations before 1970. That is, we focus on the
time sample of 19702014; taking ve-year non-overlapping averages of the data yields 9 subperiods,
the rst being 19701974 and the last being 20102014.
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We then combine the PWT 9.0 data with the WDI data on the ination rate and monetary
growth rate to get our nal data sample for all the countries during 19702014. After merging the
two datasets and retaining the observations that appeared in both the PWT and the WDI, our nal
sample has 154 countries during 19702014. Taking ve-year averages yields a balanced panel with
1,386 observations (there are missing data on some variables for quite a few countries).
4.3 Measuring the Ination Rate
In existing literature (see Aghion et al., 2009, and the references on the ination-growth nexus cited
above), the ination rate is usually measured as the percentage change in the CPI (consumer price
index). As discussed, we acquired the data on the ination rateInation, consumer prices (annual
%)from the Financial Sector section of the WDI. We denote the variable as CPI .
4.4 Measuring Growth Variables
Our dependent variable is the average annual growth of real GDP per employment, following Mankiw
et al. (1992), who use real GDP per working-age person. There are three measures of real GDP
in the PWT 9.0 (i.e., RGDP e, RGDP o, and RGDPNA). Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015, p.
3157) have provided the following guidelines:
The variables with the R-prex are best suited for comparisons over time, though only
RGDP e and RGDP o are simultaneously suitable for over time and cross-country com-
parisons. The CGDP and RGDP series, on both the expenditure and on the output
sides, are tied to multiple ICP benchmarks whenever price data for a country have been
collected multiple times. If the sole object is to compare the growth performance of
economies, we would recommend using the RGDPNA series (and this is closest to earlier
versions of the PWT).
Because we focus on comparing the growth performance of economies (how ination impacts
growth performance), we use the RGDPNA series. We divide this series by the emp series in the
PWT 9.0 to get real GDP per employment. Using this data, we can calculate the average annual
growth of real GDP per employment for each ve-year subperiod to obtain our dependent variable
growth. For instance, the average annual growth rate (i.e., growth) for subperiod 20002004 would
be [log(RGDPNA=emp in 2004)-log(RGDPNA=emp in 2000)]/4. Initial real GDP per employment
(i.e., (RGDP=emp)t 1) takes the value of the beginning year of each subperiod (i.e., the value of
year 2000 is given for subperiod 20002004).
For labor force growth measure Labor, it is measured following Mankiw et al. (1992). That
is, Labor is equal to (g + )world annual growth g plus depreciation rate plus the labor force
growth rate that is measured as the annual growth of the emp series in the PWT 9.0. We follow
Mankiw et al. to use 0.05 for (g + ). That is, we assume a 2% world annual growth and a 3%
depreciation rate. The physical capital investment rate is measured by the csh_i series in the PWT
9.0. Human capital invest rate is measured by the hc series in the PWT 9.0. We add together the
csh_x (the ratio of export value to GDP) and the absolute value of the csh_m (the ratio of import
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value to GDP; the numbers are negative) series in the PWT 9.0 to get the measure of Trade. The
last control variable is the ratio of government spending to GDP, denoted csh_g, and we use the
csh_g series in the PWT 9.0. We use the same notation here for easier comparison by readers. We
then compute the ve-year averages of the variables.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the nal data.
[Table 3 Here]
4.5 Parametric Estimation Results
Many countries in our sample experienced very high levels of ination. For instance, Zimbabwes
average annual ination was 8,603% during 20042009. Angolas average annual ination was 1,478%
during 19952000. According to our model, when the ination rate is high enough, R&D labor lr
(and thereby the balanced growth rate) will be zero. In this case, it would be meaningless to test
the e¤ect of ination on growth when growth does not change with ination any more. In other
words, the positive growth rates in these high ination countries may not be best explained by our
R&D-based Schumpeterian model. Therefore, in the following, we focus on testing the inverted-U
relationship between growth and ination in the sample with average annual ination below 30%.
4.5.1 Ordinary least squares regression results
We rst run the LSDV (least squares dummy variable) regression (i.e., ordinary least squares regres-
sion with country and year xed e¤ects). It is very possible that the observations are not independent
across groups (i.e., countries). That is, the ination rates and growth rates across countries may be
correlated. To deal with heteroskedasticity, we use robust standard errors. The LSDV regression
results are presented in Table 4.
We rst do not exclude the observations with average annual ination above 30% to see how
our empirical specication ts the recent cross-country data. According to regression 4.1 of Table 4,
the estimated coe¢cient on the logarithm of initial real GDP per employment ln (RGDP=emp)t 1
is negative and signicant at the 1% level, showing strong evidence of conditional convergence. The
estimated coe¢cient on the physical capital investment rate ln (csh_i) is positive and signicant
at the 1% level, and that on labor force growth ln (Labor) is negative and insignicant at the 10%
level. The estimated coe¢cient on human capital ln(hc) is negative and signicant at the 10% level.
Except for human capital, the results on other variables are consistent with the prediction of the
augmented Solow model. The estimated coe¢cient on government spending ln (csh_g) is negative
and insignicant, and that on international trade ln (Trade) is positive and signicant at the 1%
level. Therefore, our empirical specication ts the recent cross-country data quite well.
Now we add our variables of interest. We rst add the ination rate CPI . For comparison, we
rst include observations with annual ination below and above 30% (the full sample). The LSDV
regression results are presented in regression 4.2 of Table 4. The estimated coe¢cient on the ination
rate CPI is negative, which is insignicant at the 10% level. The results on other variables remain
similar to those in regression 4.1. The insignicant, negative e¤ect of ination on growth is consistent
27
with previous cross-country studies (see the references cited above). In regression 4.3 of Table 4, we
include both the ination rate and its square term in the regression. The regression results indicate
that growth is a U function of the ination rate.
As discussed, it is meaningful for us to exclude the observations with such high levels of ination.
Additionally, the existing literature has detected a threshold above which ination will hurt growth.
For instance, Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2011) found this threshold to be around 2% for advanced
countries and 17% for developing countries while Bruno and Easterly (1999) found that 40% annual
ination seems to be the upper limit beyond which ination may signicant reduces growth. Khan and
Senhadji (2001) also focused on the non-linear relationship between ination and growth. However,
most papers used a transformed variable of ination, and the transformation is also non-linear. For
instance, Baglan and Yoldas (2014) and Kremer et al. (2011) used the logarithm of ination when
it is above 1% and 1-ination when it is below 1% as a means of dealing with negative ination.
Taking our discussion above and the existing literature into account, we nd that when we exclude
the observations with average annual ination above 30%, growth is a signicant inverted-U function
of the ination rate. The results are presented in regression 4.4 and 4.5 of Table 4. In regression 4.5
of Table 4, we include both the ination rate and its square term in the regression. The regression
results indicate that growth is a signicant inverted-U function of the ination rate. The estimated
coe¢cient on the ination rate CPI is negative, which is signicant at the 1% level. The estimated
coe¢cient on the square term of the ination rate 2CPI is also negative, which is signicant at the
1% level. The F-test on the joint signicance of both the ination rate and its square term yields
a p-value below 1%, meaning the ination rate and its square term jointly have a signicant e¤ect
on growth. In contrast, the estimated coe¢cient on the ination rate CPI is negative, which is
signicant at the 5% level when we exclude the square term of the ination rate from the regression.
According to regression 4.5, we nd that the cuto¤ point of the ination rate with the marginal
e¤ect of ination on growth being zero is bi;t = 5:19%. The ination rate in our sample lies on the
interval [-24%, 29%] when we focus on samples with annual ination rate below 30%. The threshold
of ination is larger than the minimum level of ination and smaller than the maximum level of
ination, which indicates that growth is an inverted-U function of ination in our sample.
[Table 4 Here]
4.5.2 IV regression results
It is possible that the ination rate may be endogenous. As discussed in Bruno and Easterly (1999),
it is hard to nd an instrument that is relevant and time-varying. As a compromise, we follow the
same strategy used in Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012). In testing the inverted-U e¤ect of
government debt on growth for countries in the Euro area, Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012)
have used up to the fth lag of government debt as the instruments. However, using lagged variables
as instruments may be problematic when the endogenous variable is highly persistent over time. To
deal with this issue, Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) also used the average level of government
debt for the other countries in the Euro area as instruments.
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Following Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), we also use the same Stata command ivreg2
developed by Baum et al. (2007). We also use two-step GMM (generalized method of moments)
estimation. As noted in Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), The two-step GMM presents
some e¢ciency gains over the traditional IV/2-SLS estimator derived from the use of the optimal
weighting matrix, the overidentifying restrictions of the model, and the relaxation of the independent
and identical distribution (i.i.d.) assumption, see Baum et al (2007).
As discussed in our theory, we have it =

M t=Mt + . Therefore, we also acquire the data on the
monetary growth ratethe broad money growth (annual %)in the Financial Sector section of the
WDI. The monetary growth rate and its square term are also used as instruments when necessary.
Specically, we have used two groups of instruments. The rst group uses up to fth lags of ination,
ination square, monetary growth rate and its square (20 excluded instruments). The second group
uses up to fth lags of the average ination rate of all the other countries (i.e., the rest of the
world), the average ination rate of all the other countries and its square (7 excluded instruments).
The number of observations is 352 (covering 100 countries), while the number of observations in
regression 4.1 is 289 (covering 83 countries).5 This di¤erence is explained by the fact that many
European countries, such as Germany and France, have joined the monetary union and use the Euro
as a common currency. Therefore, these countries do not have their own monetary growth rates.
Table 5 presents the rst-stage results of the IV regression results. The F-test statistics on the
instruments are above 10, the rule of thumb for the existence of strong instruments in Staiger and
Stock (1997). That is, the instruments jointly have signicant e¤ects on the endogenous variables
(i.e., the ination rate and its square).
[Table 5 Here]
The second-stage results are presented in Table 6. In regressions 6.1 and 6.3, we have used the
lagged values of ination and its square as the instruments. According to regression 6.1 of Table
6, where we have used heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, the estimated coe¢cient on the
ination rate CPI is negative, which is signicant at the 1% level. The estimated coe¢cient on
the square term of the ination rate 2CPI is negative, which is signicant at the 1% level. The
F-test on the joint signicance of both the ination rate and its square term yields a p-value below
1%, meaning the ination rate and its square term jointly have a signicant e¤ect on growth. The
Hansen-J over-identication test yields a p-value above 0.1, meaning we accept the null hypothesis
that the instruments are valid.
According to regression 6.1, we nd that the cuto¤ point of the ination rate with the marginal
e¤ect of ination on growth being zero is bi;t = 2:78%. The ination rate in our sample lies on
the interval [-24%, 29%] when we focus on samples with annual ination rate below 30%. When
5Since economic growth in the model is innovation-driven and it is more likely to associate with advanced economies,
it would be better to divide the whole sample into several groups based on the income level to see whether the inverted-
U still holds in di¤erent groups and how income disparities among the groups alter the optimal ination rate. First, we
have considered samples with average annual ination below 30%. That is, we have excluded countries with high levels
of ination. Therefore, the economic growth of the economies in our sample is more likely to be innovation-driven.
Second, the number of observations is already small (289) in IV regressions. We have tested the inverted-U in OECD
countries, but the results are not as signicant, which may be due to the small sample bias.
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ination is below the cuto¤ value of bi;t = 2:78%, growth is an increasing function of the ination
rate; when ination is beyond the cuto¤ point bi;t = 2:78%, growth becomes a decreasing function
of the ination rate. Therefore, our two-step GMM estimation results indicate that growth is an
inverted-U function of ination in our sample.
The results remain robust when we use standard errors robust to both heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation, as indicated in regression 6.3 of Table 6. The cuto¤ point of ination with the
marginal e¤ect of ination on growth being zero becomes bi;t = 9:6%, which still lies within our
sample interval of the ination rate. Therefore, growth remains an inverted-U function of ination in
our sample when we deal with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in two-step GMM estimation.
In regressions 6.2 and 6.4, we have used the average level of ination for the rest of the world as
the instrument. According to regression 6.2 of Table 6, where we have used heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, the estimated coe¢cient on the ination rate CPI is negative, which is signicant
at the 5% level. The estimated coe¢cient on the square term of the ination rate 2CPI is negative,
which is signicant at the 10% level. The F-test on the joint signicance of both the ination rate
and its square term yields a p-value below 1%, meaning the ination rate and its square term jointly
have a signicant e¤ect on growth. The Hansen-J over-identication test yields a p-value above 0.1,
meaning we accept the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The cuto¤ point of the ination
rate with the marginal e¤ect of ination on growth being zero is 2.52%, which is similar to that in
regression 6.1. Therefore, our two-step GMM estimation results indicate that growth is an inverted-
U function of ination in our sample when we use the second group of instruments. The results
remain robust when we use standard errors robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation,
as indicated in regression 6.4 of Table 6.
[Table 6 Here]
5 Empirical Evidence on the Direct Mechanism
As discussed, Chu et al. (2017, 2019) incorporate heterogeneous rms to also predict an inverted-U
relationship between ination and growth. Therefore, it is best if we can o¤er more evidence on the
direct mechanism. To do so, we directly test the e¤ect of ination on lr (the share of R&D labor
in total labor supply), denoted R&D_S. According to our discussion following Proposition 2, our
model predicts that ination has an inverted-U e¤ect on lr (the share of R&D labor in total labor
supply). This prediction is unique to our model.
Specically, our empirical specication is
R&D_Sit = 0 + 1i;t + 2
2
i;t + 3(Controls)it + i + Tt + "it, (41)
where R&D_S (i.e., lr) is measured by Total R&D personnel per thousand employment (FTE)
from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Both R&D personnel and employment are full-time
equivalent (FTE). The data covers the period 1996-2016 for 162 countries. (Controls) are the variables
that may have an e¤ect on R&D labor share. These variables are initial real GDP per employment
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(i.e., (RGDP=emp)t 1), human capital Human, and trade openness Trade. These three variables
are used in Section 4. One additional control variable is the degree of CBI. We planned to use CBI
as an instrument for ination, but the over-identifying tests show that using it as a control variable
instead of an instrument is better.
5.1 Identication Strategy
In aggregate level studies, there is always a possibility of endogeneity. We use IV estimation to
deal with the potential endogeneity of the ination rate. As in Section 4, the broad money growth
rate (denoted M2g) is a candidate instrument. Because we have the square term of ination, we
need at least two instruments. Therefore, we also use nancial depth and its logarithm as additional
instruments. With more instruments than endogenous variables, we can use the over-identifying tests
to check the validity of the instruments.
5.2 Data Sample
We collect data on CBI from Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). We use the unweighted average of the
nine aggregated variables (i.e., CBIU in Table 9 of Dincer and Eichengreen ) to measure CBI, denoted
CBI. The data covers 1998-2010 for more than 100 countries. For nancial depth, we obtain the
necessary data from the WDI. Specically, we measure nancial depth (denoted FD=GDP ) as the
indicator Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP).
We use yearly PWT data to have many observations as possible. We then merge all the other
data into the yearly PWT panel data. Doing so yields a nal sample of 52 countries during 1998-
2010, producing a balanced panel of 676 observations. Nevertheless, there are many missing data,
especially for our dependent variable, as elaborated on below.
Table 7 presents the summary statistics of the nal data. According to Table 7, our dependent
variable has only 279 observations. Its mean is 6.59, which indicates that on average there are 6.59
FTE R&D personnel per thousand FTE employment. Jordan in 1998 has the largest value of R&D
share (22.04 R&D personnel per thousand employment). Canada has a mean value of R&D_S at
12.57 during 1998-2010. Canadas 0.01257 is close to our calibrated value for lr (see columns 1.1 to
1.3 in Table 1). We also reported the summary statistics for ination and money growth when our
dependent variable has observations. The mean of ination in our nal sample used in regressions
is 7.21%, with a maximum of 85.74%. The corresponding numbers for monetary growth are 16.46%
and 125.03%, respectively. Therefore, there are no extreme values of ination in our nal sample,
which means the results will not be driven by outliers.
[Table 7 Here]
5.3 Estimation Results
We nd that our results are similar when we do not center the value of ination. Therefore, we
report the results with the original values of ination (i.e., uncentered values).
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For comparison, we rst present the LSDV results in Table 8. Regression 8.1 of Table 8 reports
the results with the linear form of ination. One can see that ination has a positive, signicant e¤ect
on R&D_S (i.e., the share of labor employed in R&D) at the 5% level. The e¤ect becomes negative
and insignicant if we use robust standard errors. Regression 8.3 of Table 8 reports the results with
both ination and its squared term in the regression. The estimated coe¢cient of ination remains
positive and signicant at the 5% level, while its squared term is negative and insignicant. However,
we nd that the e¤ect of ination on R&D_S is concave instead of inverted-U. The results remain
similar when we use robust standard errors (see regression 8.4 of Table 8).
[Table 8 Here]
Table 9 presents the rst-stage and the corresponding second-stage results of the 2SLS (two-stage
least squares) estimation. Regression 9.1 of Table 9 reports the rst-stage results with ination as
the dependent variable. Both monetary growth and nancial depth have a positive, signicant e¤ect
on ination at the 1% level. According to regression 9.2, monetary growth has a positive, signicant
e¤ect on the square of ination, while nancial depth has a positive, insignicant e¤ect on the square
of ination. Nevertheless, both regressions 9.1 and 9.2 indicate that the F-test statistics on the
instruments are above 10, the rule of thumb for the existence of strong instruments in Staiger and
Stock (1997). That is, the instruments jointly have signicant e¤ects on the endogenous variables
(i.e., the ination rate and its square). Because the instruments are strong, we use 2SLS estimation.
According to the second-stage results presented in regression 9.3 of Table 9, the estimated co-
e¢cient on the ination rate CPI is positive, which is signicant at the 1% level. The estimated
coe¢cient on the square term of the ination rate 2CPI is negative, which is signicant at the 1%
level. The over-identication tests yields a p-value much above 0.1, meaning we accept the null
hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Moreover, we nd that the cuto¤ point of the ination
rate with the marginal e¤ect of ination on R&D_S (i.e., the share of labor employed in R&D)
being zero is bi;t = 41:86%. The ination rate in our sample lies on the interval [-10%, 86%]. There-
fore, our 2SLS estimation results indicate that R&D_S is an inverted-U function of ination in our
sample. The results remain robust when we use robust standard errors, as indicated in regression
9.4 of Table 9. When we use LIML (limited-information maximum likelihood) estimation to deal
with weak instruments when we use robust standard errors, the results in regression 9.5 of Table 9
indicate that our results remain robust.
The inverted-U e¤ect of ination on R&D_S (i.e., the share of labor employed in R&D) provides
direct support of our mechanism. As explained, only when R&D is subsidized by seigniorage revenue
is there a positive e¤ect of ination on R&D. Subsection 3.11.2 shows that subsidies to R&D by other
taxes will not explain the data, because the other taxes cannot generate the changing seigniorage
e¤ect, ending up being unable to produce the inverted-U result between ination and R&D.
[Table 9 Here]
5.4 Comparison Results with Physical Capital Investment
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If we can show that the inverted-U relationship is especially strong for R&D, as opposed to other types
of investment, that would help further. We also have the data on physical capital investment (see
Section 4). Therefore, we conduct the same regressions with the dependent variable being physical
capital investment rate ln (csh_i). To make the results comparable, we focus on the same sample
as in the previous subsection (i.e., the sample where R&D_S has observations). The second-stage
results of IV regressions are presented in Table 10.
Regression 10.1 shows that the logarithm of physical capital investment rate (i.e., ln (csh_i))
is a U-function of ination. However, the estimated coe¢cients on ination and its square become
insignicant in LIML estimation. The results hold up when we use the level of physical capital
investment (i.e., csh_i) as the dependent variable, as illustrated in regressions 10.3 and 10.4.
[Table 10 Here]
Taken together, the inverted-U result between growth and ination is driven by the inverted-U
relationship between R&D_S and ination. Such an inverted-U relation does not exist between
physical capital investment and ination.
6 Conclusions
This study introduces two elements into the seminal contribution of Aghion and Howitt (1992), which
creates a novel view of the e¤ect of ination on growth and welfare by showing that growth is an
inverted-U function of ination. The results are conrmed by calibration and empirical evidence.
The large growth di¤erences across countries may be partly explained by our mechanism. Here we
briey discuss the strong policy implications of our study.
First, the positive nominal interest rate that maximizes growth is higher than that maximizes
welfare. When the elasticity of labor supply is very high, the Friedman rule is optimal even if a
positive nominal interest rate promotes growth. Chinas average annual growth of M2 was 18.3%
during the period 20032011, generating large seigniorage revenue. With one-party dictatorship, the
autocratic government of China is able to direct the seigniorage revenue to any specic sectors of
the economy. Chinas high growth may be partially explained by our mechanism. However, Chinas
heavy subsidies to state-owned industries may promote its growth, but it may be bad for welfare.
Therefore, even without the current trade war with the U.S., China may want to re-evaluate its
industrial policies that heavily subsidize state-owned industries. On the ip side, the autocratic
government of China can choose growth rather than welfare as its objective. From this point of
view, democratic countries do not necessarily grow faster than non-democratic ones (see Persson and
Tabinilli, 2009, and Acemoglu et al., 2016, for recent democracy-growth causality studies).
Second, we treat the share of seigniorage used in R&D subsidies as given. Obviously, there are
substantial growth and welfare gains if the government could endogenize the share of the seigniorage
revenue used as R&D subsidies. Using Table 2, when 20% of seigniorage is used in R&D subsidies,
raising the nominal interest rate to its optimal value can add 1.06% annually to growth (which is
substantial), and the substantial welfare gain is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption
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of 14.32%. Of course, such e¤ects can also be generated when other taxes revenues are used as R&D
subsidies. The welfare gains are also found in Segerstrom (1998), but there is no growth e¤ect and a
negative growth e¤ect of R&D subsidies in Segerstrom (1998) and Segerstrom (2000), respectively.
It is meaningful to check whether our inverted-U results hold up in models with both horizontal
and vertical R&D considered in Peretto (1998, 1999) and Segerstrom (2000) or in models with
imitation and transfer of foreign technologies considered in Chu et al. (2014) in future research.
APPENDIX I: HOUSEHOLDS DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION
Households Hamiltonian function is
Ht = ln ct +  ln (1  lt) + t [rtat + wtlt   ct   tmt + itbt] + vt (mt   ct   bt) ,
where t is the co-state variable on (2); t is the Lagrangian multiplier for the CIA constraint. The
rst-order conditions include
@Ht
@ct
=
1
ct
  t   vt = 0, (42)
@Ht
@lt
=

1  lt
  twt = 0, (43)
@Ht
@bt
= tit   vt = 0, (44)
@Ht
@at
= trt = t  

t, (45)
@Ht
@mt
=  tt + vt = t  

t. (46)
Combining (44), (45) and (46) yields vt = t (rt + t) = tit. Plugging this condition into (42) yields
1
ct
= t (1 + it) , (47)
which is (3) in the main text. Rewriting (45) as
 

t
t
= rt    (48)
yields the intertemporal optimality condition (6) in the main text.
Equation (43) is the optimal condition for labor supply in equation (4) in the main text.
APPENDIX II: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We follow Chu and Cozzi (2014) to dene a transformed variable 
t  ct=vt. We have


t

t
=

ct
ct
 

vt
vt
= rt    

vt
vt
, (49)
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where the second equality uses the households Euler equation by combining (3) and (6).
Using equation (16), the law of motion for vt is

vt
vt
= rt + t  
bt
vt
. (50)
Using equation (17), we have
bt
vt
=

   1

+  (i  )t

yt
vt
=
 1

+  (i  )t
1  (i  )t
ctL
vt
, (51)
where the last equality uses the output market clearing condition: ct = [1  (i  )t] yt=L. We
also have t = 'lr;t. Therefore, plugging (51) and (50) into (49), we have


t

t
=
h
 1

+  (i  )t
i
L
1  (i  )t

t   ('lr;t + ) . (52)
Now using (12), (14), and ct = [1  (i  )t] yt=L, we have
lx;t =
1 + i
'
yt
vt
=
(1 + i)L
' [1  (i  )t]

t. (53)
Now using (53) and the labor market clearing condition given in equation (22), we have
lr;t = 1 
f1 +  (1 + i) [1  (i  )t]g (1 + i)L
' [1  (i  )t]

t. (54)
Now plugging (54) into (52), we have


t

t
= f (
t) 
t   ('+ ) , (55)
where f (
t) =
[  1 +(i )t]L
1 (i )t
+ f1+(1+i)[1 (i )t]g(1+i)L
[1 (i )t]
. (20) shows t =
1
1+(i )

1 + lr;t
lx;t

.
Therefore, t is a function of 
t, and so is f (
t). Combining (53) and (54) yields
lr;t
lx;t
=
' [1  (i  )t] (1 + i)L
(1 + i)L
t
  f1 +  (1 + i) [1  (i  )t]g . (56)
Using equation (20), we have
1  (i  )t =
1
1 + (i  )
 
(i  )
1 + (i  )
lr;t
lx;t
. (57)
Using (56) to substitute out lr;t=lx;t in (57), we can solve for [1  (i  )t] as
1  (i  )t =
1 + 1

(i  )
1 + (i  )
h
1 + '
(1+i)L
t
   (1 + i)
i . (58)
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Now using (58) to substitute out [1  (i  )t] in f (
t), we have
f (
t) =
1 + (i  )
h
1 + '
(1+i)L
t
   (1 + i)
i
1 + 1

(i  )

2 +
i


L  L+  (1 + i)2 L. (59)
Now plugging (59) in (55), we have


t

t
= A
t  B, (60)
where A = 1+(i )[1 (1+i)]
1+ 1

(i )

2 + i


L   L +  (1 + i)2 L, and B = ('+ )  
(i )'(2+ i )
(1+i)[1+ (i )]
. Given a
xed i, both A and B and functions of structural parameters. We have
A
L
=
1 + (i  ) [1   (1 + i)]
1 + 1

(i  )

2 +
i


  1 +  (1 + i)2 (61)
=
 + i+ (i  ) (2 + i  1) +  (1 + i) [(1 + i) (   + i)  (i  ) (2 + i)]
   + i
. (62)
Because    + i =  + (i  ) > 0, we have
sign (A) = sign f + i+ (i  ) (2 + i  1) +  (1 + i) [ (1 + i)  (i  ) (2   1)]g . (63)
Given  2
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2

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2 1
= 1
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2
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2

and (i  ) (2   1) 6 (i  ). Plugging these conditions into (63), we have
sign (A) > sign
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(i  )]

> 0. (64)
Therefore, given  2
 
0; 1
2

and  6 
2 1
= 1
2  1

, we have A > 0. Equation (60) shows that
the dynamics of 
t is characterized by saddle-point stability such that 
t jumps immediately to its
interior steady state given by 
t = B=A. When 
t is stationary and unique, lr and lx must be
stationary and unique according to equations (53) and (54). Therefore, per capita labor supply l is
stationary and unique as well. The dynamic property of the model does not depend on the sign of
B. However, because 
t = ct=vt = B=A, we need B > 0 to have a meaningful equilibrium. When
i 6 , we always have B > 0. When i > , we have
sign (B) = sign

(1 + i) ('+ ) +
(1 + i) ('+ )
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We have sign (B) > 0 if 1 + 

  2 > 0 (i.e.,  6 1
2  1

). Please note that  6 1
2  1

is a
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su¢cient condition to make sure Propositions 1 and 2 are logically consistent. That is, the economy
in Proposition 2 will always immediately jump to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth
path, and the path is meaningful when 
t = ct=vt = B=A > 0 (only when both A > 0 and B > 0).
APPENDIX III: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
As discussed, the balanced growth rate in (19) is linear in the share of labor employed in R&D lr.
Therefore, we only need to prove that lr, given in (23), is an inverted-U function of the nominal
interest rate. To make our proof easier, we dene R =  (i  ), b = (   1) and rewrite lr as
lr =


, (67)
where the numerator  = b (1 + 2R)    1

R + + 1

(1 +R) 
'
+ R and the denominator  =
b (1 + 2R) +  1

R + + 1

(1 +R).
We respect the zero-lower bound on the nominal interest rate, which means i > 0 and R >  .
Taking derivative of lr with respect to R, we have
@lr
@R
=
0  0
2
=
F (R)
2
, (68)
where we have dened
F (R) = 0  0. (69)
Plugging , , 0, and 0, into equation (69) and collecting the same items, we nd out that the
cubic terms of R cancel out. Therefore, F (R) is a quadratic function of R:
F (R) =  

1 + 2b

+
2b
'

R2  
2b (+ ')
'
R + b, (70)
where b = 1++b 2 +   1

  
'
+ +
2
'

. According to equation (70), the graph of the quadratic
function F (R) is a parabola that opens downwards. Now we have
F ( ) =  2b2   2b3
'
  2 +
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2
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 + + 1 + 2b + b   b
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+ 1 +   2. (71)
Using  6 1 and  2
 
0; 1
2

, we rewrite (71) as
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) = b
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Therefore, according to (72), we have
F ( ) > 0 if  >
b 1 + 
'

1 + 
2
+ b 2 + 2+ +22
'
 . (73)
Taken together, if  >
b(1+ ')
1+ 
2
+b2+2+ +22
'
 , F (R) = 0 has a unique solution (a unique global
maximum) R = R >  , as illustrated in Figure A.1. The maximum point of F (R) may be on
the left of ( ) because F 0 ( ) < 0 if  <
b(1+ ')
+2b(1+ ') 
b

. Nevertheless, F 0 ( ) < 0 is not
necessary for our inverted-U result.
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R
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Figure A.1. The Graph of F(R)
Taken together, when R 2 [ ;R) or i 2
h
0; R


+ 

, sign

@lr
@R
	
= sign fF (R)g > 0; when
R 2 (R;+1) or i 2

R

+ ;+1

, sign

@lr
@R
	
= sign fF (R)g < 0. Therefore, lr is an inverted-U
function of the nominal interest rate. More strictly, we have F 0 (R) < 0, using @lr
@R
= F (R)
2
yields
@2lr
@R2
jR=R =
F 0 (R)
2
 
F (R)
3
0 =
F 0 (R)
2
< 0. (74)
Equation (74) shows that lr is a concave function of R at least around R
. Therefore, lr is an
inverted-U function of the nominal interest rate around i = R


+  > 0.
APPENDIX IV: GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION BY HOUSE-
HOLDS IN THE AK MODEL
We denote investment by

kt = xt. Households Hamiltonian function is
Ht = ln ct + txt + vt [Ak   ct   tmt   (1  st) xt] + t (mt   ct   xt) ,
where t and vt are the co-state variables on

kt and

mt, respectively; t is the Lagrangian multiplier
for the CIA constraint.
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The rst-order conditions include
@Ht
@ct
=
1
ct
  vt   t = 0, (75)
@Ht
@xt
= t   vt (1  st)  t = 0, (76)
@Ht
@kt
= Avt = t  

t, (77)
@Ht
@mt
=  vtt + t = vt  

vt. (78)
Following Dotsey and Sarte (2000), on the balanced growth, ct = Ak and

kt = (1  )Ak,
where  is a constant. On the balanced growth path, st is a constant (shown in the text), and
g2 =

ct=ct =  

t=t, where we dene t = (vt + t). We conjecture

vt=vt =

t=t. Using (76) yields

t=t =

t=t. Now using (77), we have vt=t = (+ g2) =A, conrming our conjecture. Then from
(76), we have t=t = [A  (1  s) (+ g2)] =A. Plugging these conditions into (78) yields
 

vt
vt
= g2 =
t
vt
  t    =
A  (1  s) (+ g2)
(+ g2)
  t   . (79)
We have mt = Mt=Pt. Therefore,

mt=mt =


M t=Mt

  t =    t. Combining the binding
CIA constraint and the goods market clearing condition yields

mt=mt =

kt=kt = g2. Therefore,
t + g2 =  . We now have
g2 =
A
1 + +    s
  , (80)
which is (38) in the main text. Now we rewrite (39) as (1 + +  ) (g2 + ) 
 A
g2
(g2 + ) = A. Total
di¤erentiating this equation with respect to the nominal interest rate, we have
g02 =
A (g2 + )  g2 (g2 + )
(1 + +  ) g2 +
 A
g2
. (81)
Using (39), we have g2 (g2 + ) =
Ag2+ Ag2+ A
1++ 
. Now we haveA (g2 + ) g2 (g2 + ) =
A+2A+Ag2
1++ 
.
Plugging this condition into (81) yields
g02 =
A+ 2A+ Ag2
(1 + +  )2 g2 + (1 + +  )
 A
g2
(
> 0 if g2 > 0,
< 0 if   (1 + ) < g2 < 0.
(82)
APPENDIX V: STEPS OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
We use Maple 16 to conduct the calibration for an elastic labor supply case.
Step 1. Calibrating the parameters
The Maple program is as follows:
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eq1:=(gamma-1)*lx+beta*(i-rho)*xi*gamma*lx-(lr+rho/phi)*(1+i);
eq2:=lr+lx-1+theta*(1+i)*gamma*lx*(1-beta*(i-rho)*xi);
eq3:=xi*(1+beta*(i-rho))-1-lr/gamma/lx;
sols1:= solve({eq1,eq2,eq3}, {lx,lr,xi});
lx1:=subs(sols1,lx);
p1:=subs(sols1,xi);
lr:=subs(sols1,lr);
f1:=(gamma-1)/gamma/beta/(i-rho)/(1+lr/gamma/lx1)*(1+beta*(i-rho))-282570/26554;
g := phi*ln(gamma)*lr;
l := 1-theta*(1+i)*gamma*lx1*(1-beta*(i-rho)*p1);
g1 := eval(g, [gamma = 1.05, rho = 0.4e-1, i = 0.96e-1]);
l1:=eval(l,[gamma = 1.05, rho = 0.4e-1,i = 0.96e-1]);
f11 := eval(f1, [gamma = 1.05, rho = 0.4e-1, i = 0.96e-1]);
sols2 := solve({f11, g1 = 0.2e-1, l1 = .3}, {phi, beta, theta})
Step 2. Welfare analysis
u1 := (ln((1-beta*(i-rho)*p1)*lx1)+phi*lr*ln(gamma)/rho+theta*ln(1-lr-lx1))/rho;
equ1 := eval(u, [gamma = 1.05, rho = 0.4e-1, beta = 0.8e-1, phi = 31.41654624, theta = 4, i =
0.8691102130e-1]);
u := (ln((1-beta*(i-rho)*p1)*lx1*(1+x))+phi*lr*ln(gamma)/rho+theta*ln(1-lr-lx1))/rho;
equ := eval(u1, [gamma = 1.05, rho = 0.4e-1, beta = 0.8e-1, phi = 31.41654624, theta = 4, i =
0.96e-1]);
solve(equ = -56.49537768, {x});
Step 3. Drawing the gures
We use Figure 3 as an example. The Maple program is as follows:
g100 := eval(g, [gamma = 1.05, rho = 0.4e-1, beta = 0., phi = 31.41654624, theta = 2.129298312]);
g101 := eval(g, [gamma = 1.05, rho = 0.4e-1, beta = 0.8e-1, phi = 31.41654624, theta =
2.129298312]);
g102 := eval(g, [gamma= 1.05, rho = 0.4e-1, beta = 0.15, phi = 31.41654624, theta = 2.129298312]);
g103 := eval(g, [gamma = 1.05, rho = 0.4e-1, beta = .2, phi = 31.41654624, theta = 2.129298312]);
plot1 := plot(g100, i = 0 .. 3, color = red, axes = boxed, labels = [nominal*interest*rate,
growth*rate], labeldirections = [horizontal, vertical], tickmarks = [10, 6], view = [0 .. 3, 0 .. 0.4e-1]);
plot2 := plot(g101, i = 0 .. 3, color = blue, axes = boxed, labels = [nominal*interest*rate,
growth*rate], labeldirections = [horizontal, vertical], tickmarks = [10, 6], view = [0 .. 3, 0 .. 0.4e-1]);
plot3 := plot(g102, i = 0 .. 3, color = orange, axes = boxed, labels = [nominal*interest*rate,
growth*rate], labeldirections = [horizontal, vertical], tickmarks = [10, 6], view = [0 .. 3, 0 .. 0.4e-1]);
plot4 := plot(g103, i = 0 .. 3, axes = boxed, labels = [nominal*interest*rate, growth*rate],
labeldirections = [horizontal, vertical], tickmarks = [10, 6], view = [0 .. 3, 0 .. 0.4e-1]);
plots[display]([plot1, plot2, plot3, plot4]);
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APPENDIX VI: STEPS FOR GENERATING THE CROSS-COUNTRY PANEL DATA (NOT FOR
PUBLICATION)
Step 1. Generating the yearly panel data for 182 countries during 1950-2014 using PWT 9.0
We rst access www.ggdc.net/pwt (redirect to https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/). Doing
so gives us the most complete cross-country yearly panel data by Penn World Table (PWT) 9.0
(explained by Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer 2015). The webpage states: PWT version 9.0 is a
database with information on relative levels of income, output, input and productivity, covering 182
countries between 1950 and 2014.
We rst download the PWT 9.0 data in excel format. We then download the Program package
The Stata data les and do-les necessary to replicate and customize PWT, which delivers pro-
grams90.zip. We unzip the le to nd the gen_nal_pwt.do le. From the Stata13 le menu,
choose import Excel spreadsheet and open the downloaded excel data (remember to choose im-
port rst row as variable names). Now run the gen_nal_pwt.do le, and we will get pwt90_output.dta
(the yearly panel data for 182 countries during 1950-2014).
Step 2. Generating the ve-year average panel data for 182 countries during 1950-2014
We then run the following do le to get the ve-year average panel data:
gen rgdpl=rgdpna/emp // using the RGDPNA series, as discussed in the main text
gen growth=(log(rgdpl[_n])-log(rgdpl[_n-4]))/4 // calculating annual growth for each ve-year
interval
gen inirgdpl=rgdpl[_n-4] // initial real GDP per employment
gen lninirgdpl=log(inirgdpl)
gen emp_g=(log(emp[_n])-log(emp[_n-4]))/4 // calculating annual employment growth
gen labor=emp_g+0.05
gen lnlabor=log(labor*100)
gen v=year-1950
gen v1=int(v/5) // to get ve year intervals
egen group=group(country v1) // to get ve year intervals for each country
by group, sort: egen pop_mean= mean(pop) // calculating ve-year averages
by group, sort: egen hc_mean= mean(hc)
gen lnhc=log(hc_mean)
by group, sort: egen csh_i_mean= mean(csh_i)
gen lncsh_i=log(csh_i_mean*100)
by group, sort: egen csh_g_mean= mean(csh_g)
gen lncsh_g=log(csh_g_mean*100)
by group, sort: egen csh_x_mean= mean(csh_x)
gen lncsh_x=log(csh_x_mean*100)
by group, sort: egen csh_m_mean= mean(csh_m)
41
gen lncsh_m=log((-csh_m_mean)*100)
gen lntrade=log((csh_x_mean-csh_m_mean)*100)
sort country year
save "E:nPWT_2018nmy_pwt90_001.dta", replace //generating my own PWT 9.0 dta
preserve
gen vv=year-1949
keep if mod(vv,5)==0 //keeping only the necessary data points
save "E:nPWT_2018nmy_pwt90_002.dta", replace
Step 3. Merging the other variables into my PWT data
Step 3.1. Generating any interested variable (e.g., CPI) using the WDI
For the CPI (consumer price index) ination data, we rst access the World Development Indicators
(WDI) of the World Bank to download the excel les. The CPI data covers the period 1960-2017
(it is in the country by year format). We rst use the following long.do program to turn it into a
variable with the same format as in my PWT 9.0 data (the stata dta le). To do so, we need to
search in Stata and install dm88_1 in order to use the renvars command. The stata do le is
as follows:
*deleting the rst three rows of the data spreadsheet in the downloaded excel le of the WDI.
Importing the data with the rst row as variable names
renvars E-BJ n var1960-var2017
reshape long var, i(CountryName) j(year)
rename var cpi_pi
drop if year>2014
gen v=year-1960
gen v1=int(v/5)
egen group=group(CountryName v1)
by group, sort: egen cpi_pi_m= mean(cpi_pi)
rename CountryName country
rename CountryCode countrycode
sort country year
gen vv=year-1959
keep if mod(vv,5)==0
save "E:nPWT_2018ncpi_pi.dta", replace
Step 3.2. Merging the interested variable (e.g., CPI) into my PWT data
Now we merge the interested variable into my PWT dta data. The stata do le is as follows:
use "E:nPWT_2018nmy_pwt90_002.dta", clear
sort country year
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merge country year using "E:nPWT_2018ncpi_pi.dta"
keep if _merge==3
save "E:nPWT_2018nmy_pwt90_nal.dta", replace
Repeating steps 1-3 can build any cross-country panel data using the PWT 9.0 and the WDI.
If there is no data needed from the PWT 9.0, one can start from and repeat step 3 to generate
cross-country panel data. Yearly cross-country panel data can be generated similarly.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
growth (%) 1168 1.23 4.33 -30.08 30.59

CPI
(%) 1094 44.71 339.73 -23.82 8603.28
M2g (%) 1022 57.77 696.37 -71.22 21671.69
ln(RGDP/emp)t 1 1174 9.88 1.22 6.22 13.32
ln(hc) 1068 0.72 0.35 0.01 1.31
ln(csh_i) 1303 2.96 0.58 0.48 5.82
ln(Labor) 1156 1.92 0.37 -1.29 3.25
ln(csh_g) 1303 2.90 0.50 0.86 5.20
ln(Trade) 1303 3.63 0.95 -1.75 6.98
Note: The growth data are from the PWT 9.0, covering 154 countries during
1970-2014. We take ve-year averages to avoid the inuence from business cycles.
growth is annual growth of real GDP per employment (in percentage term).

CPI
is the CPI ination rate of the WDI from the World Bank (WB) (in percentage term).
M2g is the monetary growth rate of the WDI from the WB (in percentage term).
RGDP/emp is real GDP per employment (in 2011 us$). hc measures human capital.
csh_i is the investment rate. Labor is the employment growth plus 0 :05 .
csh_g is the ratio of government spending to GDP.
Trade is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP.
csh_i, csh_g, Labor and Trade are multiplied by 100 before taking logarithms.
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Table 4. LSDV Regressions Results (ve-year non-overlapping average during 1970-2014)
Dependent variable: average annual growth of real GDP per employment
Regression number
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Indep. Variable Full Sample CPI < 30
CPI
 0.001
(0.0008)
 0.0046
(0.0013)
 0.05
(0.03)
 0.34
(0.11)
2CPI
5.5 10 7
(1.6 10 7)
 0.0043
(0.0016)
ln

RGDP
emp

t 1
 6.25
(0.72)
 5.77
(0.65)
 5.77
(0.65)
 5.00
(0.61)
 5.04
(0.61)
ln (csh_i)
2.06
(0.43)
1.59
(0.42)
1.59
(0.42)
2.42
(0.43)
2.06
(0.43)
ln (hc)
 3.18
(1.79)
 1.85
(1.81)
 1.85
(1.81)
 3.06
(1.77)
 2.90
(1.75)
ln (Labor)
 0.59
(0.65)
 1.36
(0.61)
 1.36
(0.61)
 1.83
(0.69)
 1.82
(0.69)
ln (csh_g)
 0.20
(0.52)
 0.54
(0.48)
 0.54
(0.48)
 0.52
(0.46)
 0.55
(0.45)
ln (Trade)
2.02
(0.45)
3.03
(0.58)
3.03
(0.58)
1.68
(0.44)
1.68
(0.44)
Country xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES YES
Time xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES YES
F-test on ; 2
(p-value)
F(2, 711)=4.83
(0.0083)
 turning point
sample range
 39.5 [5.19]
(-69, -15) [(-24, 29)]
R2 0.40 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.52
Observations 1013 935 935 851 851
Note: growth is annual growth of real GDP per employment (in percentage term).

CPI
is the CPI ination rate of the WDI from the WB (in percentage term). For the turning points,
the rst number is the centered ination, while the numbers in brackets are the original values.
RGDP/emp is real GDP per employment (in 2011 us$). hc measures human capital.
csh_i is the investment rate. Labor is the employment growth plus 0 :05 . csh_g is the ratio
of government spending to GDP. Trade is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 5. IV Regressions Results (First-stage results)
Sample: ve-year non-overlapping average during 1970-2014 with annual ination below 30%
Regression number
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4
First-stage dependent variable as
CPI 
2
CPI CPI 
2
CPI
F test of excluded
instruments (p-value)
F(20,176)=7.83
(0.00)
F(20,176)=10.46
(0.00)
F(7,35)=7977
(0.00)
F(7, 35)=507
(0.00)
Observations 289 289 352 352
Note: Instruments: 5.1-5.2: up to fth lags of ination, ination square, monetary growth
rate and its square (20 excluded instruments); 5.3-5.4: the average ination rate of the
other countries, its square, up to fth lags of the average ination rate of the other
countries (7 excluded instruments).
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Table 6. IV Regressions Results (two-step GMM)
Second-stage results. Dependent variable: average annual growth of real GDP per employment
Sample: ve-year non-overlapping average during 1970-2014 with annual ination below 30%
Regression number
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
Indep. Variable Correct for heteroskedasticity
Correct for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation
CPI
 1.51
(0.49)
 2.88
(1.52)
 1.35
(0.49)
 3.04
(1.34)
2CPI
 0.018
(0.007)
 0.041
(0.023)
 0.016
(0.007)
 0.044
(0.020)
ln

RGDP
emp

t 1
 7.22
(1.29)
 8.13
(1.30)
 7.10
(1.28)
 8.30
(1.36)
ln (csh_i)
1.67
(0.69)
1.34
(1.08)
1.89
(0.66)
1.09
(1.00)
ln (hc)
2.52
(3.13)
3.71
(4.26)
3.31
(3.09)
4.18
(4.02)
ln (Labor)
 3.30
(0.90)
 2.75
(0.64)
 3.37
(0.82)
 2.95
(0.69)
ln (csh_g)
 2.48
(0.62)
 1.12
(0.63)
 2.24
(0.56)
 0.92
(0.58)
ln (Trade)
3.22
(0.75)
2.03
(0.83)
2.74
(0.72)
1.94
(0.78)
Country xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES
Time xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES
Hansen J test
(p-value)
17.23
(0.51)
9.10
(0.11)
12.63
(0.81)
9.44
(0.09)
Test on ; 2
(p-value)
chi2(2)=18.38
(0.0001)
chi2(2)=15.10
(0.0005)
chi2(2)=17.45
(0.0002)
chi2(2)=13.58
(0.0011)
 turning point
sample range
 41.9 [2.78]
(-69,-15) [(-24,29)]
 35.1 [9.6]
(-69,-15) [(-24,29)]
 42.2 [2.52]
(-69,-15) [(-24,29)]
 34.5 [10.2]
(-69,-15) [(-24,29)]
R2 0.33 0.25 0.34 0.23
Observations 289 352 289 352
Note: Endogenous variables: ination and its square. Instruments: 6.1, 6.3: up to fth lags of
ination and its square, monetary growth rate and its square; 6.2, 6.4: the average ination rate
of the other countries, its square, up to fth lags of the average ination rate of the other countries.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics
Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
R&D_S 279 6.59 5.57 0.04 22.14

CPI
(%) 657 8.77 20.12 -10.07 325.00
279 7.21 11.60 -10.07 85.74
M2g (%) 667 181.09 4204.92 -99.88 108613.3
277 16.46 16.61 -25.55 125.03
FD/GDP 675 51.84 47.18 1.27 312.12
ln(FD/GDP) 675 3.50 1.04 0.24 5.74
CBI 668 0.45 0.20 0.1 0.79
ln(RGDP/emp)t 1 676 10.07 1.07 6.73 12.31
ln(hc) 676 0.90 0.25 0.11 1.30
ln(Trade) 676 3.85 0.65 2.06 6.13
Note: The growth data are from the PWT 9.0, covering 52 countries during 1998-2010
(yearly panel data).
R&D_S measures lr (i.e., the share of R&D labor in total labor supply), which is
measured by Total R&D personnel per thousand employment (FTE) from the
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (http://data.uis.unesco.org/index.aspx?queryid=63#).

CPI
is the CPI ination rate of the WDI from the WB (in percentage term).
M2g is the monetary growth rate of the WDI from the WB (in percentage term).
FD/GDP is nancial depth from the WDI (in percentage term). CBI is degree of
central bank independence (ranges from 0 to 1) from Dincer and Eichengreen (2014).
RGDP/emp is real GDP per employment (in 2011 us$). hc measures human capital.
Trade is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. We also reported the
summary statistics for 
CPI
and M2g when R&D_S has observations.
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Table 8. LSDV Regressions Results (yearly panel data during 1998-2010)
Dependent variable: R&D employment share R&D_S
Regression number
Indep. Variable 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4
CPI
0.030
(0.014)
 0.001
(0.0008)
0.030
(0.014)
0.030
(0.016)
2CPI
 0.0002
(0.0002)
 0.0002
(0.0003)
CBI
3.77
(0.76)
3.77
(0.65)
ln

RGDP
emp

t 1
 6.25
(0.72)
 5.77
(0.65)
0.29
(0.71)
0.29
(0.70)
ln (hc)
 3.18
(1.79)
 1.85
(1.81)
4.85
(2.96)
4.85
(2.90)
ln (Trade)
2.02
(0.45)
3.03
(0.58)
 2.20
(0.41)
 2.20
(0.44)
Country xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES
Time xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES
F-test on ; 2
(p-value)
F(2, 222)=4.99
(0.0076)
F(2, 222)=3.87
(0.0222)
 turning point
sample range
85.96
[-10.07, 85.74]
85.96
[-10.07, 85.74]
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observations 278 278 278 278
Note: R&D_S is measured by Total R&D personnel per thousand employment (FTE).

CPI
is the CPI ination rate of the WDI from the WB (in percentage term).
CBI is the degree of central bank independence.
RGDP/emp is real GDP per employment (in 2011 us$). hc measures human capital.
Trade is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(8.1, 8.3 standard errors in parentheses) (8.2, 8.4 robust standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 9. 2SLS Regressions Results (yearly panel data during 1998-2010)
Regression number
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5
First-stage results Second-stage results
Dependent variable as
Indep. Variable CPI 
2
CPI R&D_S R&D_S R&D_S
CPI
0.222
(0.065)
0.222
(0.077)
0.232
(0.085)
2CPI
 0.0026
(0.00096)
 0.0026
(0.0011)
 0.0028
(0.0012)
M2g
0.23
(0.04)
18.71
(3.17)
FD=GDP
0.10
(0.03)
3.87
(2.77)
ln(FD/GDP)
 10.06
(2.60)
 384.41
(210.95)
CBI
 14.36
(8.21)
 744.40
(664.82)
4.58
(0.97)
4.58
(0.97)
4.61
(1.01)
ln

RGDP
emp

t 1
8.55
(7.65)
554.05
(620.07)
0.80
(0.89)
0.80
(1.04)
0.83
(1.08)
ln (hc)
 45.16
(31.06)
 4819.85
(2516.24)
0.57
(4.29)
0.57
(3.74)
0.23
(3.93)
ln (Trade)
 6.83
(4.51)
 550.07
(365.62)
 1.75
(0.54)
 1.75
(0.60)
 1.74
(0.61)
Country xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES YES
Time xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES YES
F test of excluded
instruments (p-value)
F(3,219)=21.79
(0.0000)
F(3,219)=15.44
(0.0000)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.3434 0.3597
 turning point
sample range
41.86
[-10.1, 85.7]
41.86
[-10.1, 85.7]
41.41
[-10.1, 85.7]
R2 0.66 0.49 0.97 0.97 0.97
Observations 276 276 276 276 276
Note: Endogenous variables: ination and its square. Instruments: M2g, FD/GDP, and ln(FD/GDP).
9.5 used LIML estimation to deal with weak instruments.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(9.1-9.3 standard errors in parentheses) (9.4, 9.5 robust standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 10. IV Regressions Results between Ination and Physical Capital Investment
Second-stage results (yearly panel data during 1998-2010)
Regression number
10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4
Estimation methods
2SLS LIML 2SLS LIML
Dependent variable as
Indep. Variable ln(csh_i) ln(csh_i) csh_i csh_i
CPI
 0.023
(0.011)
 0.065
(0.076)
 0.001
(0.003)
 0.013
(4.03)
2CPI
0.00033
(0.00016)
0.001
(0.0012)
0.00003
(0.00004)
0.002
(0.062)
CBI
0.12
(0.18)
0.05
(0.38)
0.02
(0.05)
 0.18
(6.65)
ln

RGDP
emp

t 1
0.13
(0.15)
0.03
(0.35)
0.14
(0.03)
 0.16
(9.60)
ln (hc)
0.23
(0.71)
1.71
(2.60)
0.17
(0.13)
4.77
(144.58)
ln (Trade)
0.58
(0.12)
0.58
(0.18)
0.10
(0.03)
0.12
(0.67)
Country xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES
Time xed e¤ects YES YES YES YES
Over-ID test (p-value) 0.0001 0.0039
R2 0.66 0.19 0.77 .
Observations 276 276 276 276
Note: Endogenous variables: ination and its square. Instruments: M2g, FD/GDP,
and ln(FD/GDP). Over-ID test means over-identication test.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(robust standard errors in parentheses)
55
